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QUESTION PRESENTED
The sole issue presented by this petition is whether the
decision of the Court of Appeals should be reviewed by this
court because of an abuse of discretion by the Court of
Appeals.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, W.W. & W.B.
Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah
1977) .

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs filed a complaint on June 17, 1982, alleging
that

defendants

had

sold

pre-need

mausoleum

spaces

to

plaintiffs, having no intention of ever building a mausoleum.
In 1976 and 1985 the mausoleums in question were built.
December 2, 1987, defendants moved for summary judgment.
(R. 1200)
arguments

After considering the parties' oral and written
the court

indicated

it was

inclined

to grant

defendants' motion. Plaintiffs responded asking for leave to
file a fifth amended complaint, for the purpose of clearly
stating a valid cause of action which would survive the
arguments raised in defendants' motion for summary judgment.
The court denied defendants' motion without prejudice and

1

granted plaintiffs' leave to amend.

(R. 1301) Said complaint

was also supposed to narrow the claims before the court.
In

fact,

plaintiffs'

Fifth

Amended

Complaint

only-

broadened the scope of plaintiffs' contentions, and added
several new theories and claims not previously alleged.
example, plaintiffs alleged
mausoleum,

as

For

for the first time that the

built, breached

a warranty

regarding

its

appearance, and alleged that defendants, some five years and
seven months before, maliciously refused to disinter a Mr.
Wheeler, Mrs. Schoney's father, when his disinterment was
requested by plaintiffs.
Prior

(R. 1312)

to receiving defendants' Answer to the Fifth

Amended Complaint, plaintiffs requested an expedited trial
setting.

(R. 1336-1339, 1343)

Plaintiffs' motion for an

expedited trial setting was set for hearing on February 17,
1988.

(R. 1342)

Plaintiffs were not represented at the

hearing, at which a discovery cutoff date (June 10, 1988), a
motion cutoff date and the trial date (July 6, 1988) were set.
(R. 1360)
On

April

29,

1988,

defendants'

Fourth

Set

of

Interrogatories to Plaintiffs were served on plaintiffs by
mail.

(R.1361-62)

Plaintiffs failed to answer within the

30-day time to answer and failed to answer by the discovery
cutoff.

2

Defendants' counsel contacted the office of plaintiffs'
counsel between June 3 and June 12 to get answers to the
interrogatories.

(R. 1398, tr. 5-6)

June 14, 1988, defendants filed a new motion for summary
judgment containing the same arguments raised in December
1987, plus arguments relating to the new causes of action
raised

in the Fifth Amended Complaint.

(R. 1363, 64 J1

Defendants also moved to strike plaintiffs' Fifth Amended
Complaint for failing to respond to discovery.

(R. 1363-63)

After receiving written submissions and hearing oral
argument, the trial court granted both motions. (R. 1372, 7879 ) 2

Only at the hearing did the plaintiffs deliver their

purported Answers to Interrogatories.

Neither answers nor a

certificate of service of answers are part of the record of
this case.3
Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. Their
Docketing Statement and Briefs state that the summary judgment
is appealed but do not state or argue that the order entering
default judgment pursuant to Rule 37 was not proper.
Appendix,

Exhibit

A

(Docketing

(Appellants' Brief), Exhibit C
Exhibit D (Reply Brief).

Statement),

(See

Exhibit

B

(Respondents' Brief), and

This court poured the appeal over

to the Utah Court of Appeals.
While the matter was pending before the Court of Appeals,
plaintiffs

filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and a

3

Petition to Recall Jurisdiction in an attempt to circumvent
the Court of Appeals in its consideration of the matter.
The Court of Appeals after a full and fair hearing before
a panel consisting of Judges Billings, Garff and Orme affirmed
the Default Judgment, determining that consideration of the
grant of summary judgment was not necessary. Thereafter, this
Petition for Certiorari was filed.
The appeal and all subsequent petitions have been filed
solely to avoid the consequences of the failure to respond to
defendants' motion for summary judgment and submit facts to
controvert facts submitted by defendants sufficient to provide
a genuine issue of material fact, and to answer defendants'
interrogatories in order that defendants could make their
final motions and go to trial as scheduled without prejudice.4

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
EACH APPLIED ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW TO
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE AND RULED PROPERLY.
When viewed in their proper context these arguments are
merely

plaintiffs'

excuses

and

attempts

to

shift

responsibility from their own conduct and failure to comply
with basic rules of procedural fairness, and their claim is
simply that the striking of their complaint and consequent
imposition

of

Default

Judgment

for

failure

to

Interrogatories was too harsh a sanction in this case.
4

answer

The only basis under Rule 47 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure to justify certiorari is (c)
When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings or has so
far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision;
As set forth in the facts stated above, after requesting
and receiving an expedited trial date plaintiffs failed to
answer defendants' final set of interrogatories which inquired
into issues raised for the first time in plaintiffs' Fifth
Amended Complaint,

The issue of sanctions for failure to

answer arose only after defendants' informal efforts failed
to result in any response.
Plaintiffs'

(R. 1398, tr. 5-6)5

Petition

is

fraught

with

innuendo,

misstatements and half truths to bolster their contentions.
For example, plaintiffs allege "Memorial Estates acknowledged
receiving unsigned answers to its discovery on June 15. (Tr.
p. 4 1. 20, R. 1398) (Exhibit E)
on June 20, 1988.

(R. 1292)"

Signed answers were served

(Exhibit F) Neither statement

is true or supported by the record.6

The first purported

Answers to Interrogatories, signed or unsigned, ever served
or delivered were hand delivered by counsel for plaintiffs at
the courthouse just prior to the hearing on June 21, 1988.
(R. 3, 6, attached hereto as Exhibit E)
The trial court, instead of departing from the accepted
and

usual

course

of

judicial
5

procedure

as

alleged

by

plaintiffs, followed Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park
West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977).
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that if a party fails to serve answers to interrogatories:
The court in which the action is pending,
on motion, may make such orders in regard
to the failure as are just, and among
others, it may take any action authorized
under paragraphs (A) (B) and (C) of
subdivision (b)(2) of this Rule.
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides that such action by the Court may
include:
. . . dismissing the action or proceeding
or any party thereof, or rendering a
judgment
by
default
against
the
disobedient party; . . . .
In the case of W.W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West
Village, Inc. , 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), just as in this case,
the lower court granted a summary judgment and at the same
time, granted judgment by default as a sanction pursuant to
Rule 37(d). In Gardner, the defendants contended the sanction
was inappropriate because they had served answers to the
interrogatories prior to the hearing on the motion for a
default judgment.

The court rejected that argument stating

that if a party fails to answer within the specified time
under the rule, that party has failed to answer and the court
may

appropriately

invoke

the

sanction

of

dismissal.

Addressing the issue of judgment by default as a sanction, the
court commented on the 1972 amendment to the rule as follows:

6

Rule 37(d) allows the imposition of
sanctions against a party for especially
serious disregard of the obligations
imposed upon him by the discovery rules
even though he has not violated any court
order . . . . Until 1970, the rule applied
only if a failure by a party was willful.
This limitation has been eliminated. In
addition, the rule now says, as Rule
37(b)(2) always has said, that the court
is to make "such orders with regard to the
failure as are just." Taken together,
these two changes mean that any failure
of the sort described in Rule 37(d)
permits invocation of the rule, regardless
of the reason for the failure, but that
the court has discretion about the
sanction to be imposed.
Gardner at 737, See also 8 Wright & Miller Federal Practice
and Procedure §2291 pp. 807-802
The Gardner

court agreed

that the trial court was

justified in finding there was no reasonable excuse for the
failure to comply with Rule 33.

The court further stated

paraphrasing the case of Merrill Lynch. Pierce. Fenner &
Smith. Inc. v. Echols. 183 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742, 743
(1976):
. . . there was no significance in the
fact plaintiff submitted answers to the
propounded questions before the hearing
on defendant's motion for sanctions. The
court ruled once the motion for sanctions
has been filed, the opposing party may not
preclude their imposition by making a
belated response in the interim between
the filing of the motion for sanctions and
the hearing on the motion.
The

Gardner

court

appropriate whether

reiterated

that

a party has moved

7

sanctions

are

pursuant to Rule

37(a)(2) for an order compelling the other party to respond
to discovery, or not, and further stated:
The extreme sanction of default or
dismissal must be tempered by the careful
exercise of judicial discretion to ensure
its imposition is merited.
Under Rule
37(d), sanctions are justified without
reference to whether the unexcused failure
to make discovery was willful.
The
sanction of default judgment is justified
where there has been a frustration of the
judicial process vis., where the failure
to respond to discovery impeded trial on
the merits and makes it impossible to
ascertain whether the allegations of the
answer have any factual merit.
A defendant may not ignore with impunity
the requirements of Rules 33 and 34 and
the necessity to respond within 30 days,
to request additional time or to seek a
protective order under Rule 26(c).
A
party to an action has a right to have
the benefits of discovery procedure
promptly, not only in order that he may
have ample time to prepare his case, but
also in order to bring to light facts
which may entitle him to summary judgment
or induce settlement prior to trial.
Gardner at 738.
This case is somewhat like the anecdote of the five blind
men trying to describe the elephant.
positions

and

causes

of

action

have

Plaintiffs' various
been

difficult

to

understand and to relate to the other positions and causes of
action.

Defendants needed the answers to interrogatories in

order to understand the latest causes of action and the
alleged facts supporting them.

Whether or not the sanction

of dismissal is normally imposed in cases of default is not
applicable to this case. Since 1982 not only have plaintiffs
8

attempted to file five amended complaints, they have also
subjected the courts to numerous (at least four) petitions for
extraordinary relief.

Because of the number of plaintiffs'

claims, past and present, and the constant revision and
amendment defendants were not only entitled to the answers to
their final interrogatories, the answers were necessary for
consideration of the final dispositive motions and for trial
preparation, if necessary.7
Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the interrogatories
further prejudiced the defendants by effectively preventing
them from following up on their timely discovery request when
trial was set to commence only two weeks away.8
In addition while no motion to compel had been filed by
defendants the lower court had set discovery cutoff with
defendants'

final

discovery

specifically

at

issue

and

specifically in light of the plaintiffs' request for and
obtaining of an expedited trial date.
Defendants have not attempted to delay, but have only
attempted to get a grasp of plaintiffs' ethereal theories.
The imposition of sanctions is discretionary with the
trial court.
undisputed.

The circumstances warranting sanctions are
The sanction of default judgment is specifically

mentioned in Rule 37.

The scope of the Court of Appeals

inquiry is limited to whether the trial court abused its
discretion. The Court of Appeals properly concluded the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.

9

II
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO APPEAL
OR EVEN ADDRESS THE ENTRY OF DEFAULT
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 37
All of the argument contained in the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, regarding the sanction of default judgment, is
raised for the first time at this late date.

Said argument

was not raised in the trial court in response to defendants'
Motion to Strike.

Review of the appeal file containing

plaintiffs' docketing statement, Appellants' Brief and Reply
Brief reveals no argument whatsoever on the issue of default
judgment.

Plaintiffs did not argue that they should not be

sanctioned unless their failure was willful.

(R. 1398)

Arguments should not be first raised in a Petition for
Certiorari, when

the issues

could

have been raised

considered in the Court of Appeals, but were not.

and

Because

plaintiffs failed to appeal or brief the instant issue before
the Court of Appeals, they are precluded from claiming that
the careful decision of the Court of Appeals now warrants
exercise of this court's discretionary review.

The Court of

Appeals properly upheld the trial court decision.

See,

Bennion v. Hansen 699 P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); Zions First Nat'l
Bank v. Nat'l Am. Title Insurance Co., 749 P.2d 651, 655 (Utah
1988).

10

CONCLUSION
The Argument that the Court of Appeals has "usurped the
trial court's power" is a conclusion not justified by a review
of the facts and decision.

The Court of Appeals only upheld

the trial court's use of power and discretion.

Plaintiffs

fail to identify any particular in which the Court of Appeals
exercised discretion.

An appellate court is required to

uphold the trial court's ruling when at all possible.

Mel

Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, 758 P.2d 451 (Utah
1988); Bennion v. Hansen, supra; Bill Nay & Sons Excavating
v. Neelev Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (1984).
This case presents no special or important reason to
warrant

exercise

jurisdiction.

of

the

Court's

discretionary

review

There are no disputed facts regarding the

failure to answer and the sanctions. The courts below applied
established principles of law in deciding the legal issue
presented.

The petition should be denied.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure defendants move the court for an order granting
their attorney fees on the grounds that plaintiffs' petition
is frivolous, not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing
law and not based upon a good faith argument.

11

DATED this Q?

day of July, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

Earl J. Peck
/
Stephen L. Henriod
Attorneys for Defendants

12

1.Plaintiffs contend that two identical summary judgment motions
were denied. One was denied on June 24, 1985, when plaintiffs'
discovery had not been completed (R. 693). The subsequent motion
dated December 29, 1988, was denied without prejudice so plaintiffs
could attempt to rehabilitate their complaint with the fifth
amended complaint setting into motion the chain of events leading
to the summary judgment and default judgment. It is true that each
motion argues that for summary
judgment is proper because
plaintiffs had failed to sustain any cause of action, however,
there is no basis here to argue that hearing a subsequent motion
for summary judgment after allowing a party additional time to
correct fatal deficiencies is in any way improper.
2. The contention is made several times that the trial court
admitted it "had not read the file". As evidenced by the June 21,
1988, transcript, it is clear that the court had not re-read the
file immediately prior to the hearing on June 21, 1988, but that
it was thoroughly familiar with the case from oral argument and its
prior hearings.
3.Plaintiffs imply by consistently stating "Memorial Estates claims
to have mailed . . . " (emphasis added) that plaintiffs Fourth Set
of Interrogatories were not served on April 29, 1988, as the
certificate of service, signed by counsel, states they were. No
facts in support of this contention are cited by plaintiffs.
Counsel for defendants personally mails documents when the
certificate is so executed.
4.Much of the record is cited regarding the discovery history of
the case, obviously in an attempt to make it appear that the
defendants were derelict in their duty to respond to discovery.
The plaintiffs never by motion or otherwise prior to appeal
complained about any alleged delay or failure to answer or the
content of any discovery responses of defendants, and the Court of
Appeals properly declined to consider such contentions made for the
first time on appeal. See, e.g. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National
Am. Title Ins. Co., supra.
5.Plaintiffs in their Questions for Review and Point I of their
Argument label the failure to answer interrogatories as "excusable
neglect" as if such a finding had been made. The failure was not
characterized by the trial court as other than a "failure to
answer" as required by Rule 37.
It was not excusable and no
reasons were offered to excuse the failure.

13

6.Plaintiffs contend as facts that defendants received and
acknowledged receipt of interrogatory answers before June 21. This
is not true, and of the two record citations which do not support
the statements, (1) Tr. p. 4, 1. 20, R. 1398 (Exhibit E) is the
statement of counsel for defendants at the June 21, 1988 hearing
that plaintiffs were served the interrogatories regarding the Fifth
Amended Complaint. The transcription is confusing but it obviously
is not acknowledgment of receipt of answers (see Exhibit F ) , and
(2) R. 1292 (Exhibit F) is a certificate of service by defendants
to plaintiffs of certain supplementary answers to interrogatories
on January 12, 1988.
7.Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Gardner, supra, because in
Gardner the court characterized the party sanctioned as one whose
"persistent dilatory tactics frustrated the judicial process",
apparently not realizing that plaintiffs tactics in this case have
frustrated the judicial process to defendants' prejudice
particularly with respect to defendants' motion for summary
judgment and preparation for trial.
8.The cases cited by plaintiffs in Point I of their Argument hold
consistently on one issue, namely that it is within the discretion
of the trial court to award sanctions.
Some discuss "willful
failure", none discuss "excusable neglect", and none is a case in
which a court's sanction for failure to answer under Rule 37 as it
presently exists has been reversed. The cases requiring "willful
neglect" predate the 1972 amendment which eliminated the
requirement of "willful neglect" to award sanctions. See e.g. 8
Wight & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures §2291, page 807812, supra.

14
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DOCKETING STATEMENT
(Subject to assignment
to the Court of Appeals)
Case No.

MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC.,
et al.,
Defendants/Respondents.

Supreme

COMES

NOW

Appellant,

Court

9,

and

pursuant

submits

the

to

Rule

following

of

Utah

docketing

statement.
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
This

appeal

is

filed

pursuant

to Utah Code Ann.

§78-2-2(3)(i)(as amended 1986).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This

is

an

appeal

from

a

final

judgment

of the

Third Judicial District Court granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment as to all claims of plaintiffs.

JUDGMENT DATE
The judgment appealed from was entered July 18,
1988.

Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was filed on August 16,

1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1974, plaintiffs entered into a contract with
defendant

for

purchase

structed mausoleum.

of

mausoleum

space

The contract provided

would build a mausoleum when one-half
mausoleum were sold.

in

an uncon-

that defendant

the spaces for the

The contract also promised plaintiffs

the use of a chapel on the cemetery grounds for funeral
services.

Plaintiff Erma Schoney's parents also purchased

pre-need mausoleum space at the same cemetery.

Plaintiffs

brought suit alleging that the mausoleum had not been built
timely, and that the cemetery chapel had been rented to an
insurance

company.

Plaintiffs

also

alleged

that

the

mausoleum ultimately built (several years after this lawsuit
was filed) was different in appearance from the appearance
represented

to

them

at

the

time

of

purchase

in

1974.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleged breach of contract and fraud.
In 1975, plaintiff Erma Schoney's father died, and
was interred in the ground at defendant's cemetery.

Plain-

tiffs' suit alleged that this ground burial was made because
2

defendant promised that the mausoleum would be constructed
in six months.
mother

In early

purchased

1987, plaintiff

mausoleum

space

in

Erma Schoney's

another

cemetery.

Plaintiffs allege that they requested permission to disinter
Erma's father, but that defendants refused to allow it until
the morning
mother.

of

the

funeral

of

plaintiff, Erma

Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants lost the

location of plaintiff Erma Schoney's
suit

Schoney's

alleged

that

defendant's

father.

conduct

Plaintiffs'

constituted

an

intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The contract payments made by plaintiffs" were not
held in trust for construction of the mausoleum, but were
used for business purposes.

Plaintiffs allege that this was

in violation of an oral trust agreement, and in violation of
statute governing pre-need cemetery sales.

Plaintiffs also

alleged that the contract required formation of a trust which
was not done.
Plaintiffs'

action

was

originally

certified

by

Judge Fishier as a class action on behalf of all pre-need
mausoleum

contract

holders.

"decertified" the class.

3

Two years

later, Judge Dee

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court err in concluding, as a

matter of law, that defendant had not breached its contract
to

build

mausoleum

space,

provide

chapel

space

and

to

establish a contractual trust?
(I
.^ft^
iLwu

be " / J?
u (Xi 2.
wh4ther

Should

a

jury have been allowed

to decide

plaintiffs suffered emotional distress from defen-

dant's breach of contract?
3.

Were all plaintiffs' claims barred as a matter

of law by the statutes of limitation?
4.

Did

Judge

Dee

a

class

of

"decertifying"

abuse

his

contract

discretion

holders

by

previously

certified by another district court judge?
5.

Whether

defendant's

conduct

regarding

the

disinterment of plaintiff Erma Schoney's father could give
rise to intentional infliction of emotional distress?
6.

Was the trial court in error in dismissing

plaintiffs' claims for breach of statutory, common law and
contractual trusts?
7.
issue

of

defendant's

Did

fact

plaintiffs' evidence

regarding

intentions

to

fail

raise

an

misrepresentation

of

fraud

or

build

a mausoleum,

chapel space, and to establish trusts?

to

to

provide

g

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

P

1.

All the issues listed above

(except No. 4)

were originally decided in plaintiffs' favor by Judge Dee.
^

Judge Moffat should not have changed rulings made by Judge
Dee.

Madsen v. Salt Lake County Sch. Bd., 645 P.2d 658 (Utah

/

1982).

Likewise, Judge Dee should not have changed Judge

Fishier's ruling regarding issue 4.
2.

Plaintiffs'

claims

for

fraud,

breach

of

contract and deceptive consumer practices, were supported by
affidavit and deposition testimony.

Summary judgment should

only be granted when there is no reasonable probability that
/

plaintiffs can prevail.
1984).

Snyder v. Merkl^, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah

A correct application of this standard is determina-

tive of plaintiffs' appeal.
3.

Jfi

Plaintiffs' claims

for

breach

of

statutory

trust is supported by Utah Code Ann. §8-4-12 and 13, and §224-1, et seq.
4.
defendant's

Plaintiffs' claims for mental distress from
breaches

of

contract

is

an

issue

of

first

impression in Utah, as are plaintiffs' claims for breach of
common law trust.

5

5.

Plaintiffs' claim for intentional

infliction

of emotional distress is governed by Samms v. Ecclesy 358
P.2d 344, 11 Ut.2d 289 (1961).
PRIOR APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiffs previously sought a writ of mandamus to
direct Judge Dee to make findings of fact and conclusion of
law to support his decertification
granted on September 3, 1985.

order.

The writ was

Plaintiffs sought a writ of

mandamus to direct Judge Dee to allow filing of an amended
Complaint.

The petition was denied on November 18, 1985.
ATTACHMENTS
1.

Exhibit A

is a copy of the final

judgment

appealed from.
2.

Exhibit B is a copy of plaintiffs' notice of

appeal
DATED this

c ^ ^ d a y of

^^^ii<iiah

, 1988

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/
Appellants

ROfeERT J. DEBRY
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the A^h

day of r-^^pf , 1988,

true and correct copy of the foregoing DOCKETING STATEMENT
(George K. Schoney, et al. v. Memorial Estates, et al.), was
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a copy of the same in
the U.S. mail, to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
David Swope
NEILSON & SENIOR
P. 0. Box 11808
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

/ek
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Joseph L. Henriod (1468)
Earl Jay Peck (A2562)
Stephen L. Henriod (1469)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Teleohone: (801) 53 2-1900

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. SCHONEY
IRMA J. SCHONEY, et al. ,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC.
et al.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER, SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

Civil No. C82-4983
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant Memorial Estates, Inc.'s:
(i)

Motion to Strike George K. Scnoney as a party

plaintiff;
(ii)

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs1 Complaint and enter

default judgment for failure to answer Defendant's Fourth Set
of Interrogatories; and,
(iii)

Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing

at the final pre-trial pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Notice

and Stipulation of the parties.
counsel, Daniel F. Bertch.

Plaintiffs were represented by

Defendant was represented by Earl

Jay Peck and Stephen L. Henriod.
Having considered the motions, affidavits and other
submissions, and the arguments of counsel, the Court enters the
following orders:
Plaintiff George K. Schoney is dismissed as a party, it
appearing that he died February 19, 1986, his death was
suggested on the record on or before December 29, 1987 and no
motion for substitution has been made.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted for
the reason that based upon the pleadings and the uncontroverted
affidavits and depositions, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact in any cause of action and defendant is entitled
to its judgment as a matter of law.
Judgment should be entered upon the additional ground
that plaintiff has failed to respona to Defenaantfs Fourth Set
of Interrogatories.

Plaintiff failed:

To answer the

interrogatories within the time to answer; to answer prior to
the Court's designated last date to respond to all outstanding
discovery; or to answer prior to the filing of Defendant's
motion for sanctions.

Said failure to answer impedes trial on

the merits and prejudices defendant's ability to prepare for
the early t r i a l date, set for July 6, 1988, requested by
plaintiffs.
A judgment of no cause of action is, therefore, hereby
entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff Irma
Schoney; aefendants are awarded their costs herein, and George
K. Schoney is dismissed as a party with prejudice.
DATED this

/*?

day of July, 19b8.

^EST
' ~

CLERK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true copy
of the foregoing Order, Summary Judgment and Judgment by
rJU^if

Default, postage prepaid, this

27

day of _£==«-, 1988, to

Daniel P. Bertch
Robert J. DeBry
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4U01 South 700 East, 5th floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
1. THE UNDERSIGNED, CLE^K OF THE D*ST*Cl
CC'JP.T OF SALT LAKE CO'JKTY, UTAH, DO HGH«Y
CEB^-SY THAT THE ANNEXED V N D FO*EGOlKG ?S
A T=VJE A\C r ULL CO?Y OF AM ORIGINAL DOCUMENT CU *JL£ !N MY OFriCE AS SUCH CLE**.
WITNESS Ui HAND AND SEAL Or i,AiO COLfTT

ft: f r* i" ci z e r l '?FCic*
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DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4 72 8
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0 84 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
<T,
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

•o£Wfo
'%\r,

.

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
ERMA J. SCKONEY, et al.
Plaintiffs,

;

vs.

;

MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC.,
et al.,

\i
'
i

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Civil No. C82-4983
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendants.
Notice

is

hereby

given

that

plaintiffs

hereby

appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah from the judgment entered
against them in this action on July 18, 1988.
DATED this

ff)

day of

fitta.unJ'

, 1988

J

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By

///

n
?w,
',/S^s
•<A

DANIEL F. BERTCH

ni F nrsav
i ILL

kj<ji

I

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify

t h a t on the

In

day of

QjjQ'ftfl
J

1988,

true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL,
(George K. Schoney, et al. v. Memorial Estates, et al.), was
mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing a copy of the same in
the U.S. mail, to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
David Swope
NEILSON & SENIOR
P. 0. Box 11808
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

^nc/gj
/

/jj

COu-.r^ C r ZM^ L*<£ )
I. T - L : U N C H ^ S t ^ - D . CLE0*". Or THE D t S T S O l
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THIS i S l H DAY OF

'h.t&s.:*T

H DfXON H f t t O L E Y ^ L E R K / ^ , ,
BY
J^-U^/v
-s / ? T 7 ^ ^
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DEPUTY

f\a-\M_s

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
ERMA J. SCHONEY, et al.

]|

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

;

;
|
]
;1

MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC.,
et al.,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Case No. 880630-CA
Category No. 16(b)

Defendants/Respondents.
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COUNTY
HONORABLE RICHARD MOFFAT
DANIEL F. BERTCH
ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
JOSEPH I.. HENRIOD
DAVID SWOPE
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
36 South State, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellate jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to §78-22(3) (1) Utah Code Ann. .

This case was poured over to the Court

of Appeals pursuant to §78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is in the business of providing cemetery and
mausoleum

spaces,

similar products.

funeral

services,

markers,

caskets,

Froirf-1972 ^to^l974 7^Defendant began a -mausoleum

sales program called j:public ^relations -sales "program. uepo. p. 12).

and

(Moore

Mausoleums were to be located at a Redwood Road

location and one at 3115 East 7 800 South called the "Mountain
View" location. Under this program, one-half

the spaces of a

proposed mausoleum were sold to families before construction (Id.
at 9, 14-15)#
construction

Once one-half of the mausoleum spaces were sold,
would

begin."*

(Id.)

This

is

called

because rhe sale is made before the time of death.
The

sales

program

represented

to consumers

that

price was at cost and did not include a profit.
Sometime
Bill Nordin,

"pre-need"
(Id. at 8.)

the pre-need

(Id. at 9.)

in [1973 or 1974 J a salesman

for defendant,

called on the Schoney family to sell them spaces

in a mausoleum.

(Nordin depc. p.8.)

After

hearing Nordin's

n
"usual presentation," the Schoneys purchased two spaces in an
unconstructed

mausoleum.

plaintiff's Complaint.)

(Nordin

depo.

p.9;

Exhibit

The purchase agreement

1 to

(labeled the

"Mausoleum Estate Agreement") obligated defendant in part:
To provide use of the full service chapel . . .
•

*

*

To complete the mausoleum
with constructructionv"*". . within one year from the date
that- the Public Relations Development Program on that is completed,
(Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint).

The contract does not

specify whether the spaces were to be at the Redwood Road or
Mountain View Mausoleum.
Nordin showed the Schoneys a drawing that laid out the
crypt locations in the mausoleum.

(George Schoney depo p. 10.)

George and Erma selected two specific crypts located "at eye
level".

(Id. at 10,11).

George Schoney testified that the

mausoleum space he purchased was "the Memorial Estates in the
east side"

(Id, at 19) commonly known as the Mountain View

location (Id. at 20).

See also George Schoney depo. p. 21, 22

"[the family] didn't want to be buried over there on the west
side anyway.

. .-

Erma Schoney depo. p. 4-5, 9)

Nordin

represented that a chapel had been started at the Mountain View
location (Id. at 22). He further stated that the Schoneys would
have access to the Mountain view chapel and be able to have
funeral services at the chapel. (Id. at 22).
Nordin promised that the Schoneys would

have use of

the chapel at no charge (Erma Schoney depo. p. 8).

^<v^

He also

stated

that

the money

from the Schoney's

purchase would

specifically used for construction of the mausoleum.

(Id.)

be
Paul

Moore, former general sales manager for defendant from 1960-1966f
^te^y/

and a sales representative from 1972-1974 (Moore depo. p. 4, 5)
confirmed that it was his understanding that the money would be
used for building the mausoleum.

(Id. at 9, 14, 15).

During Nordin's presentation, he showed the Schoneys
pictures of the chapel and proposed mausoleum at Mountain View.
(George Schoney depo. p. 9). Moore agreed that it was a standard
policy to show an artists drawing of what the mausoleum would
look like.

(Moore depo. p 22, 23). The drawing was identified
^^^fi

as Exhibit 1 to the Moore deposition.
Several months after the Schoneys had purchased preneed spaces at Mountain View, Erma's father (Clint Wheeler) died.
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). It had always been the intent of the
11

^
*7/9

Schoneys and Erma's parents to be interred together at Mountain
View.

(Affidavit of Erma Schoney, 1/5/88 para. 1, 2) .

Because

the Mountain View mausoleum was not built, Erma had no choice but
to

have

her

arrangement.
burial

was

father

in

the

ground

as

a

temporary

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 9). This temporary ground
induced

father] would
months."

buried

(Id.)

by

defendant's

only be there

promise

that

"he

[Erma's

[i.e. in the ground] about six

(See also George Schoney depo. p. 41 "he would

be moved in six months.")

Erma and her family were "strongly

opposed to ground burial" for personal reasons.
affidavit, para. 5; Erma Schoney depo. p. 18.)

(Erma Schoney
Because the

"^-^

Schonevs were assured that Clinton Wheeler's ground burial was
only temporary, no marker was placed on his grave.

(Affidavit of

Erma Schoney, para. 5).
After Clinton Wheeler's burial in 1974, Erma and her
mother went to the Mountain View cemetery "lots of times" to "see
if they were building it [i.e. the mausoleum]."
^

(Erma Schoney

depo. p. 11). Erma was "very concerned" about it and "worried".
•^

(Id.)

Erma asked the defendant when the mausoleum was to be

built. (Id.)

George also testified that he went "once a year" to

see about the building of the mausoleum (George Schoney depo. p.
40).

Defendant "told George that it would be started in the

near future; this went on for 8 years.

(Id. at 42).

Eventually, George was told that "there wasn't enough
people
I CA^

j}

interested

mausoleum."'"

at the present time

for them to build a

(Id. at 48-49). George got the impression that "they

would never build it."

(Id.).

It was in 19 81 that George

decided defendant wasn't going to build a mausoleumr and so he
and Erma and Mrs. Wheeler purchased alternate spaces at Sunset
Lawn mausoleum.

(Id. at p. 43, 45).

The Schoneys alleged that

this was on or before March 29, 1981. (Second Amended Complaint,
para. 11).
During the passing years, defendant

fa Had—to

track of the unmarked -crave of Clinton Wheeler.

keep

(Affidavit of

ErmaJSchoney, para. 7). Erma and defendant disagreed as to where
Wheeler was buried.

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 16).

As a result,

defendant's agent "had to use a long metal probe to locate the
SlP

C&tJ

casket."

(Affidavit of Erma Schoney^para. 7; Erma Schoney depo.

p. 16).

Erma averred that -to disturb his grave in this manner

was very distressful to us."

(Id.).

Sometime prior to about/1977f "^he cemetery chapel at
Mountain

View

was

cemetery

chapel

completed.

was

rented

The Schoneys

as office

alleged

space.

that

(Fifth

the

Amended

Complaint, para. 31). This was conceded in Mr. Holt's deposition
where he stated that the salesmen "know that the area of the
building

that

will

eventually

house

the

pews

and

the

whole

operation is currently office space..." (Holt depo. p. 42; R.
1299).

Defendant

instead

substituted

use

of

which were provided to defendant free of charge.

L.D.S.

g^

chapels

(Id. at p. 44). #cr

The chapel was rented to defendant's previous company, Security
National Life Insurance Co. (Quist depo. Ex. 1 and 2 ) . The total *t<??fproceeds received by defendant from renting the cemetery chapel*^^ $
is at least $200,000.

(Quist depo. exhibits 3-11).

After the Schoneys decided that defendant was not going
to build a mausoleum at Mountain View in the foreseeable future,
they

purchased

mausoleum

substitute

at Sunset Lawn.

mausoleum

spaces

in

an

existing

(Erma Schoney depo. p. 12).

Erma

averred that:
Before my mother died, we asked Memorial
Estates to release my • father's body so it
would be placed next to his wife at Sunset\
Lawn when
she died.
Memorial Estates
refused.
Finally, on the morning of my . 4 / 4 ^
mother's funeral, thev released his bodv. \ <^cd^ fC,
This was severely distressing and upsetting \
^j
to us, to be faced with the inability to lay \ ab^>^ P'
my parents to rest together.
Even more
upsetting was the fact that my mother never

1

knew she would be able to be interred with
her husband.

(Affidavit of Erma Schoney, paragraph 8.)

George testified that

"right up until the night before the funeral, we didn't know but
what we were going to have him in one place and her in another
place. . . - (Id.).
nights worrying

George confirmed that Erma "spent a lot of

about it

. . .

it caused a lot of grief,"

(George Schoney depo. p. 47-48).
„
f

Ajita

George stated that he "still had the nightmare, until

we found another place [i.e. Sunset Lawn] that I could be there

—^

any time, the same way."

(Id. at 46).

When defendant finally relented and allowed Mr. Wheeler
to be disinterred and transferred to Sunset Lawn, the Schoneys
Q
<f

learned that there had been water damage to Mr.

Wheeler's casket

due to what appeared to be poor materials used.

(George Schoney

depo. p. 47).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Class Certification:
The Schoneys brought their claims individually and on
behalf of a class of pre-need consumers of defendant's services.
On February 10, 1983, the action was certified as a class action
by Judge Fishier. (R. 202). The class was defined as "all those
persons

who

have

signed

a

standard

form

agreement

purchase of mausoleum space from the defendant."
February 10, 19 84, defendant
tifiec. £(R. 487)}

for

(R. 294).

the
On

moved to have the class decer-

On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an order
6

decertifying the class. /(R. 704)J

Judge Dee refused to enter

findings

of

of

fact

decertification

and
order.

conclusions
(R.

681).

law

in

support

Plaintiffs

of

the

successfully

obtained a writ of mandamus requiring Judge Dee to enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support decertification. (R.
998).

Judge

Dee's

findings

and

conclusions

were

entered

on

December 4, 1985. j(R. 1053)?)
Discovery;
Plaintiffs served interrogatories on defendant on June
17,

1962. (R. 12).

Defendant answered the interrogatories on

August 27,1982, approximately 26 days late. (R. 50).

Plaintiff

submitted to defendant a second request for documents on January
28, 1983. (R> 197). No answer has ever been filed.

The Schoneys

submitted a third request for documents on March

1,1983.

225).

(R.

No response has ever been filed.
Defendant submitted a second set of interrogatories on

July 11, 1983, to the Schoneys. (R. 328A).
30 days later on August 11, 1983.

They timely responded

(R. 356).

The initial round of discovery was completed by August
11,

1983.

1967,

when

No further discovery was conducted
plaintiffs

submitted

another request for documents.

further

until June 12,

interrogatories

and

Defendant sought and received an

extension of time until* September 15, 1987, to answer discovery.
(R. 1121).

A discovery cut-off was imposed of December 8, 1987,

and a trial date of December 7, 1988 set.
did not answer by September 15.
7

(R. 1136).

Defendant

Finally, on October 28, 1987,

the Schoneys' counsel sent a letter reminding defendant of its
discovery obligation and delay. (R. 1164).

Defendant partially

answered plaintiff's discovery by mailing interrogatory answers
on November

24, 1987. (R. 1166).

discovery cut-off.
compel

This was

13 days before

Plaintiff was forced to bring a motion to

further answers on December 8, 1987. (R. 1150).

This

motion was granted, in part, by order entered December 23, 1987.
^

J^

sur^X

The Schoneys also requested more time to do follow-up discovery
because of defendant's late and incomplete answers.

This request

was denied. (R. 1187).
Meanwhile, defendant sent discovery to plaintiffs on
June 26, 1987.

Plaintiffs' answers were filed (without objection

A from defendant) on August 13, 1987.
*/A^

sent a final set of interrogatories and requests for documents to

0 plaintiffs'
r

Defendant claims to have

^

June

counsel on April 29, 1988.

20, 1988.

These were answered on

Because the answers were 18 days late, Judge

Moffat struck plaintiffs' complaint and entered default judgment
aoainst them.
Trial Settincs:
Plaintiff first certified the case for trial on May 3,
1983.

(R. 263).

Defendant objected. (R. 269).

certified the case on September 13, 1983.

Plaintiff again

(R. 390).

Upon Judge

Leary's poor health, plaintiff moved for a new trial judge to
avoid delay. (R. 522) .
Plaintiffs

certified

April 22, 1986. (R. 1067).

the case as ready

for trial on

By scheduling order of September 22,
8

1966, the case was given a first place trial setting on February
9,

1987.

(R.

1069).

However,

effective January 31, 1987.

Judge

Dee

suddenly

Plaintiff requested a special pro

tempore judge to prevent delay of a trial. (R. 1085).
denied.

retired

This was

By scheduling order of May 14, 1987, the case was given

a trial date of August 24, 1987. (R. 1096).

Upon defendant's

request for a continuance, the trial date was changed to December
7, 1987. (R. 1136).
upon

defendant's

This was again changed to February 1, 1988

request.

(R. 1139).

motion, the trial was continued.

Upon

the court's

(R. 1301).

own

Upon plaintiff's

request (R. 1336 and 1338), the case was reset for trial on July
6, 1988. (R. 1360).
Summary Judgment:
On

February

10,

1984, defendant

moved

for

summary

judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint.

(R. 494).

On June 24, 1985, Judge Dee entered an

order denying defendant's motion. (R. 693).
second

motion

for summary

judgment

Defendant filed a

es to all

complaint on December 29, 1967. (R. 1200).

causes

in this

This motion was in all

^ C

second motion was denied by Judge Moffat on January, 1988. (R. ^
1301).

Defendant filed a /thircTTrpotion for summary judgment on 4>
•

—

—

•

—

.

June JL4, _1988.

—

• —

•••—••

(R. 1363).

i

.

i *

—

—

—

—

—

—

^

—

—

—

This motion was granted by Judge

Moffat as to a]
all causes in plaintiffs' complaint
1988. (R. 1377).

Q

^
^

^

9m

s

*

on June 27, ^~C^CK

POINT

/

DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PLACE
7 5% OF THE SCHONEY'S PAYMENTS IN TRUST UNDER
U.C.A. 22-4-1
A.

Claim for Breach of Trust - 22-4-1.
Utah Code Ann. §22-4-1 required defendant to maintain

75% of the money paid by pre-need plaintiffs in a trust.
rt&w

statute

The

at the time of plaintiffs' purchase applied when "money

is paid for a purpose of finishing or performing funeral services

9 *A
c

>ot

or the furnishing or delivery of any personal property, merchandise, or services of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at
any time.

. . for future use at a time determinable by the death

of the person

. . . ".

§22-4-1.

The act excludes "cemetery lots,

vaults, mausoleum crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges, and
cemetery space..." (Emphasis added).

Plaintiff claimed that the

exclusion for "mausoleum crypts" did not extend to unconstructed
mausoleum crypts.
The legislature amended §22-4-1 in 1983 to include:
personal property, merchandise, or services
of any nature to be conveyed or delivered at
any time
. . . including ...unconstructed
mausoleum crypts ..."
£.

§22-4-1 (1971) Required a 75% Trust.
Pre-need sales have been so flagrantly abused in the

cemetery business, that over half the states have enacted preneed laws.

These laws require that money paid under a pre-need

cemetery contract be held in trust.

The case of Utah Funeral

Directors v. Memorial Gardens of the Valleyy

408 P.2d 190, 17

Utah 2d 227 (1965), explains the purpose of these statutes:
10

One of the main purposes of the pre-need laws
is to make sure that after the solicitations
of such contracts, the embalming and funeral
services will be furnished as contracted to
the extent that the trust funds and earnings
can accomplish this. 17 Utah 2d at 232 •
State v. Anderson, 408 P.2d 864 (Kan. 1965) added:
[Because of] a great time lag between the
time of beginning and performance . . . there
is
a public interest in the protection of
funds intended for a particular purpose, from
whatever hazard, whether the normal vicissitudes of business, or plain fraud and deceit.
The statute as originally written in 1971 shows from
its face that it meant to cover pre-need arrangements.

The title

refers to trusts for "pre-arranged funeral plans," and indicated
a broad reading of that phrase to include

"any agreement" to

provide property and services in the future at the time of death.
The sale of pre-need mausoleum space fits this intention.
exceptions

list

what

property and services.
spaces.

are

normally

understood

to

be

The

existing

This would not include pre-need mausoleum

The purpose of protecting pre-need consumers would be

frustrated by a reading excluding pre-need mausoleum sales from
the trust protection.
Defendant's
crypts."

claim was that it was selling

"mausoleum

However, defendant did not sell a mausoleum crypt.

It

sold the right to the use of a non-existent piece of personal
property

at

a

Defendant

sold

performed

in

time -determined
a promise

the

future.

to

by

build

11

plaintiff's

a crvot

Thus, the

"mausoleum crypts" should not aoolv.

the

(services)

7 5% trust

death.
to be

exemption

for

C^

If 22-4-1 (1971) Was Unclear, Then The 1983 Revision Should
Apply Retroactively.
The 1983 legislature made explicit that the 75% trust

applied

to unconstructed

mausoleum

crypts.

The Utah

Supreme

Court has held "when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify
the meaning of an earlier enactment, the amendment may be applied
retroactively in pending actions." State, Dept. of Soc. Services
v. Hiocs, 656 P.2d 998, 1001 (Utah 1982) ..."
Corp. v. Ohio Cas. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d
1987).

Shelter America

843, 845

(Utah App.

The 1971 version was at least unclear whether the 75%

trust applied to pre-need unconstructed mausoleum crypts.

The

19 83 amendments made clear the intent of the prior enactment, and
the amendment should apply in pending actions such as this one.
Further, since the operation of a cemetery is impressed
with a public purpose, any contract implicitly includes a clause
rendering the contract subject to any changes made in the laws.
Diamant v. Mnt. Pleasant Westchester Cemetery Corp., 2 01 N.Y.S.
2d 861 (Sup. 1960); Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Fercliff Ass f n., 198
N.Y.S. 2d 287 (A.D. 1960).

Silver Ktn. Cem. Ass'n v. Simon, 231

N.Y.S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
implied

Similarly, each contract has an

term that the performance of the contract will comply

with any applicable

law.

1980).

Thus,

Schoneys

interest

on

the

75%

of

her

Hall v. Warren, 632 P. 2d 848
are

entitled,

contract

payments

present.
POINT

12

A

at

a

from

(Utah

minimum,
19 63

to

to
the

THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT HAD
BREACHED THE SCHONEYS' CONTRACT BY DELAYING
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MOUNTAIN VIEW MAUSOLEUM
A.

Claim for Delay in Construction.
Plaintiffs claimed defendant was obligated to build a

mausoleum at Mountain View "within one year from the date that
W\

i the

(A*

i completed."

r^

Public

Relations

Program

by
is

Fifth

completed
(Tr.

delayed

Development

that

upon

Complaint,
the

Public

sale of

1/2

at p. 22-24).

the

actual

Program

mausoleum spaces.
B.

Amended

defendants

mausoleum.
dants

Program

on

that

unit

is

(Mausoleum Sales Agreement para, headed "Design and

Construction;"
conceded

Development

by

para.

2.)

Relation
of the

It was

Development

spaces

in the

Plaintiff claimed that defen-

completion

voluntarily

of

the

Public

abandoning

Relations

sales

of

the

(Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 3-5).

Defendant's Obligation to Build a Mausoleum Began one Year
After it Stopped Selling Mausoleum Spaces at Mountain View,
The

Program was
• Kimball

v.

completion
a condition

of

the

Public

Relations

precedent to defendant's

Campbell, 699 P.2d

714

(Utah

1985).

Development
performance.
Because

the

fulfillment of the conditions was dependent on defendant's acts
(i.e. sales of mausoleum spaces), it was required to make a goodfaith

effort

to

complete

the

conditions.

School of Business, 560 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1977).

Connor

v.

When a good faith

effort is not made, the condition is deemed fulfilled.
supra.

Stevens

Conner;

Thus, defendant's obligation to build began one year from

the time it failed to make a good-faith effort to fulfill the
conditions by selling 1/2 of the spaces.
13

As early as 1975, defendants had abandoned its active
efforts to fulfill the conditions by selling pre-need mausoleum
r ^i
n

spaces.
reasonably

(Keith

Hughes

found

that

depo., p. 35).
a

good-faith

A

jury

effort

to

could

have

fulfill

the

condition would require at the least an active continuing effort
to sell 1/2 of the spaces.

Defendants put no evidence in the

record that their abandonment was beyond their control.

A jury

could have concluded that defendant's obligation to build was
triggered when efforts to sell 1/2 the spaces were stopped.
Defendant also contended that plaintiff bought space at
Redwood Road and that because a mausoleum was built in 1976,
foJ
W

there was no breach.
L

fr \ /
A*V
g

$*

(Tr. at p. 13).

However, the Schoneys

alleged that they bought mausoleum space at Mountain View.

This

was supported by the affidavit or Erma Schoney and deposition
testimony of both Erma and George Schoney.

Because the evidence

/ ) -

^\T

was conflicting as to whether plaintiffs bought at Mountain View
or Redwood, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on
the basis that a mausoleum was timely built at Redwood Road.

POINT
THE SCHONEYS CLAIM THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO
BUILD THE MAUSOLEUM AS PROMISED SHOULD BE
SENT TO A JURY.
A>

Claim for Breach of Warranty.
Plaintiff

claimed

she

was

mausoleum intended for Mountain View.
para 8.)

shown

a

drawing

of

the

(Fifth Amended Complaint,

She alleaed that the mauscleum as built was different,

and of inferior quality.

The Mountain View mausoleum was built

in 1985. (Answer to Interrogatory 5, November 24, 1987).
E.

The Statute of Limitations Began to Run When the Mountain
View Mausoleum Was Built in 1985.
Defendant contended that plaintiff had bought space at

Redwood andf therefore, the wrong, if any, began upon completion
of the 1976 Redwood mausoleum.

(Tr. at p. 18).

Of course, the

Schoneys' testimony was always that they bought at Mountain View.
Thus, the statute of limitations began to run in 1985 when the
Mountain View mausoleum was constructed.

Defendant made no claim

that plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty was untimely if it
related to the Mountain View mausoleum.

\A°

C.

There was No Evidence in the Record that the Mountain View
Mausoleum (As Built) was the Same as the Mausoleum Shown to
Plaintiffs.

^S^

There was no evidence in the record that the Mountain

Dview mausoleum looked like the drawing shown to the plaintiffs in

\flfi

1973.

V^

substantially the same."
of

Defendant's counsel opined that "the two mausoleums are
(Tr. p. 17). However, Moore stated at

his deposition that the mausoleum as shown, and the mausoleum as

j (J^t built, were

"absolutely" not the same.

(Moore depo. p. 24).

hf/tM- Moore stated the constructed one was "inferior" and an "eyesore."
(Id. at 24-25).
Because

the

mausoleum

A jury might or might not share that opinion.

trial
was

court

built

as

had

no

basis

represented,

inaocrocriate.

POINT
15

i

to

decide

summary

whether

the

judgment

was

^
^T

WHETHER THE CHATEL WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE
SCHONEYS TO USE WAS AN ISSUE OF FACT
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

The Schoneys' Claim
Chapel.
The

^
**?

cemetery

Schoneys

chapel

Amended

from

Complaint,

for Wrongful Rental

alleged
1977

para

to

of

the

that

defendant

rented

1984

as office

space-

31.)

The

Schoneys

sought

Cemetery
out

the

(Tifth
an

order

to*
o

requiring

a restitution of

the chapel rental proceeds

to the

owners of cemetery plots and mausoleum spaces who were entitled
to use of the chapel.. (Id. at p. 18).
B.
There was no Factual Basis for This Court to Conclude that
the Chapel was not Rented out and Unavailable for Funeral
Services.
There was no evidence in the record that the chapel
was not rented to Security National Life.

Instead, the evidence

in the record shows that salesmen for defendant were told "the
area that will eventually house the pews and the whole operation
L ^
A hi

is currently office space."

(Holt depo. p. 42).

the chapel was not being rented

Further, if

and was available, why would

defendant substitute use of LDS chapels for funerals?
44).
was

(Id. at

The only basis the court had to support defendant's motion
defendant's

counsel's

statement

that there was

an uncon-

troverted affidavit that there was a chapel available at Mountain
View.

(Tr. at 19, 51).

There is no such affidavit.

court was unaware of such a basis (Tr. at p. 48).
counsel

specifically

represented

to

the trial

The trial

The Schoney's

court

that

the

chapel was not available because there was an insurance company
in there.

(Tr. at p. 47).
16

The reason that there was next-to-nothing in the record
as to whether the Mountain View chapel was available is because
that claim was first made at oral argument.

The Schoneys had, in

fact, made a formal request for entry onto land for the express
purpose of taking photographs of the chapel filled with desks,
filing cabinets, and etc.

Had either counsel or the court known

of that basis for defendant's motion, an evidentiary record could
have been made.

As it was, all the trial court had was the

assertion of defendant's counsel that a chapel was available, and
the assertion of the Schoney's counsel that the chapel was not
available.

Such is not the stuff of which summary judgments can

be made.
C.

The Schonevs Could Sue to Redress a Past Use of the Cemetery
Chapel for Non-Cemeterv Purposes.
A cemetery may not be put to any use inconsistent with

repose of the dead.
App.

Vidrine v. Vidrine, 225 So. 2d 6691 (La.

969) ; Michels v. Crouch, 122 S.K.2d 211

1538);Winc v.

Forest Lawn Cemetery Assn,

(Tex. Civ. App.

101 P.2d

1940); Benson v. Lakewood Cemetery, 267 N.W. 510
Moore

v. U.s. Cremation

Riddell,

106

S.W.

2S2

Co., 9 N.E.2d
(Ken.

1907);

795

Frank

1099

(Cal.

(Kinn. 1936);

(N.Y.); Kertle v.
v.

Cloverleaf

Park

Assn, 148 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1959); Connolly v. Frobeniurs, 574 P.2d
971 (Kan. App. 1978); Arlington Cem. Co. v. Hoffman, 119 S.E. 696
(Ga.

1961).

This

prohibition

is

cemetery management are trustees.
Cemetery, 130 A.
Ass^Ji, 89 N.W. 872

373

grounded

in

the

idea

that

See e.c. Dennis v. Glenwood

(N.J. 1924); Braun v. Kaolewood

Cemetery

(Kinn. 1902); Hines v. State, 149 S.W. 1058
17

(Tenn. 1911); Cave Hill Cemetery v. Gosnell, 161 S.W. 980 (Ky.
App. 1913).
Use of the cemetery chapel for insurance offices is a
flagrant abuse of the interests and rights of the consumers who
have purchased cemetery lots and mausoleum spaces.

A court of

equity should be available to redress such an abuse.

POINT
THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT CONCLUDE AS A
MATTER OF LAW THAT NO FRAUD HAD BEEN
PRACTICED ON THE SCHONEYS.
A.

The Schoneys' Claim for Fraud:
The

that

the

(Fifth

Schoneys

Schoneys

Amended

had

alleged

that defendant

purchased

Complaint,

para

specific
18).

had

represented

mausoleum

This

spaces.

allegation

was

supported by the deposition testimony of the Schoneys' that they
selected specific mausoleum spaces when Nordin made the sale to
i \A

I

them.
(George Schoney depo. p. 10-11). Moore's testimony also
confirmed that specific spaces were sold.

l/

The reality is that defendant sold many more mausoleum
spaces than it actually had.
19).

(
(A^

A

(Fifth Amended Complaint, para. 17,

This fact was not explained to the Schoneys.

19).

Actually,

defendant

spaces

in 1973 or 1974 (Smith depo. p. 37).

time the Schoneys purchased.
people

stooped

assianina

(Id. at para.
specific

crypt

This was about the

Thus, the specific mausoleum spaces

(like the Schoneys) thought they were buying were non-

existent .
18

Defendant's argument to the trial court was that the
Schoneys had "not alleged" there was never a crypt available to
them.

(Tr. at p. 31).

Defendant's intent was to substitute a

crypt space at Redwood Road.

Of course, the Schoneys did not

want "any" crypt; they had purchased a specific crypt space at a
J(

specific location (Mountain View).

/^p

The fact that defendant could

have substituted a different crypt in a different location merely
points up the fraud.
consumers

think

substituted.

The tactic is a kind of bait and switch;

they're

getting

one

thing,

but

another

is

The trial court erred by concluding as a matter of

law that the Schoneys could not prove fraud.

POINT

k

THE SCHONEYS' CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WAS NOT TIMEBARRED.
—

The Schonevs' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress.
The Schoneys pleaded a claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress
June 6, 1983

in their Second Amended

(Count 10).

Complaint

filed

They repleaded this theory in their

Fifth Amended Complaint cf January 26, 1988.
B.

The Statute of Limitations.
Defendants'

ground

for

dismissing

the

count

for

intentional infliction of emotional distress was "the statute of
limitations on that claim has run."
^g^

w

£s made that

facts

(Tr.

at p. 25).

No claim

alleged did not state a cause cf action.

/ W ^ . Defendant claimed that the relation back provision cf Rule 15(a)
19

did not apply because the wrong or liability alleged in the Fifth
Amended complaint was different from that in the second Amended
Complaint, and it required different proof.

Defendant calculated

the four-year limitation period from May 22, 1982.

(Tr. at p.

49) .
C.

Leoal Standard and Standard of Appellate Review.
If

the

intentional

Fifth Amended Complaint
or occurrence

set

infliction

count

alleged

in the

"arose out of the conduct, transaction

forth or attempted

to be set

forth

in the

[Second Amended Complaint], the amendment relates back . . . " .
Rule 15(c).

Since the question is answered solely by comparing

the two pleadings, the appellate court simply reviews for error.
D.

The Schonevs' Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Disti•ess m th e Fi ftn Am-ended Comolaint Relates Back Unaer
Rule 1 5 f £J_ to the Claim for Intentional Inflict ion :in the

Second Amenoed Comolamt.
Defendant's

claim

counsel

represented

that

the

Schoneys'

for intentional infliction of emotional distress

in the

Fifth Amended Complaint was a new cause of action brought up for
the first time.

(Tr. p. 25).

Actually, the Schoneys pleaded a

separate claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
in the Second Amended Complaint of June 6, 19 83, just over one
year from the culmination of the entire transaction between the
named parties.

(Second Amended Complaint, para. 53). Under Rule

15(c), the claim for intentional infliction in the Fifth Amended
Complaint related back to at least the
The

following

allegations

Complaint show substantial similarity
20

Second Amended Complaint.
in

the

Fifth

Amended

with those in the Second

Amended Complaint.

Included are citations to the April 1, 1983

depositions

Schoneys

of

the

for the

facts

alleged in the Fifth Amended Complaint.
of these facts since at least that time.

more

specifically

Defendant was on notice
The allegations which

are bracketed were taken from the Second Amended Complaint:
[Defendant's advertising program is designed
to promise customers a sense of peace,
comfort and security through the purchase of
"pre-need" mausoleum space and
related
services. Plaintiffs have paid money in good
faith.
However, defendants have failed to
provide peace, comfort, and
security.]
(Verbatim, Second Amended Complaint, para.
53.)
Defendant's knew, or should have known, that
named plaintiffs were opposed to ground burial for philosophical and personal reasons.
(Erma Schoney depo. p. 18, April , 1983).
[Plaintiffs agreed to a ground burial for
Clinton Wheeler in 1974 in reliance on
defendant's express promise that he would not
be there more than several (less than six)
months.]
(George Schoney depo. p. 16). (cf.
Second Amended
Complaint,
para. 14,
regarding defendant's scheme to substitute
cheaper ground plots.)
Further, because of the temporary nature of
the interment, his grave was not marked.
(Erma Schoney depo. p.16)
[However,
defendants
intentionally
or
recklessly delayed building the mausoleum for
years.] (cf 2c. Comoiaint' oara. 12, 13, 20,
43-48.)
Moreover, with the passage cf time, defendants lost track of the locaticn.
(Erma
Schoney depo. p. 16). Ultimately, defendants
were forced to use a long metal probe to
locate the grave. (Id. at 11.)
[Due to the long delay, and defendants'
stated intention not to build the mausoleum,
plaintiffs' purchased other mausoleum space
21

at Sunset Lawn.]
(Id. at
Amended Complaint, para 11).

11-12)

(Second

When plaintiff Erma Schoney's mother died,
she was interred at the Sunset Lawn.
Defendants intentionally refused to allow the
father of plaintiff Erma Schoney to be
disinterred, and reinterred at Sunset Lawn
with his wife. (George Schoney depo. p. 4 546.) Finally on the morning of the funeral,
defendants relented and allowed plaintiff
Erma Schoney's father to be transferred. (Id.
at 47-48).
[Defendants' conduct, together with the acts
alleged above, has caused great turmoil and
severe emotional distress to the named
plaintiffs.
Defendants' conduct was done
wilfully and in reckless disregard for their
rights and sensibilities.]
(Second Amended
Complaint, para. 53.)
A reasonable person should have known that
defendants' conduct would cause such severe
emotional distress. (New allegations).
Thus, the allegations in the Fifth Amended
are

nothing

more

than

a compilation

of

allegations

Complaint
from

the

Second Amended Complaint, as more particularly set forth in the
Schoneys' depositions of April 1, 1983.

POINT 7
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO PROPERLY SERVE A
FORMAL SUGGESTION OF DEATH, THE ACTION WAS
IMPROPERLY DISMISSED AS TO GEORGE SCHONEY'S
ESTATE.
A.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant made an oral motion to dismiss the action as

to George

Schoney, pursuant

to U.R.C.F.

25.

(Tr. at p. 8 ) .

Defendant represented that a suggestion of death upon the record
had been made more than 9 0 days before the hearing.
0.11).

(Tr. at.

Defendant was referring to a statement in its motion for

summary

judgment

filed

motion,

however,

did

on

December

not mention

29, 19 87.
Rule

(Id.).

25, nor

argue

That
George

Schoney's death as a basis for dismissal.
B.

No Proper Suooestion of Death Was Ever Made.
A

pleading.

suggestion

of

death

upon the

See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. Form 30.

record

is

a

formal

A passing reference

somewhere in the record to death of a party is insufficient.

In

Blair v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 104 F.R.D. 21 (W.D. Pa. 984) a
reference to death of a party was made in a pleading.

The court

stated:
This Court does not agree that the reference
to plaintiff's death in the November 4, 1983
pleading triggered the running of the 90 day
time limit. Under Rule 25(a), the time for
filing a motion for substitution commences
only after the death of the party is formally
suggested on the record by the filing and
service of a written statement of the fact of
death as provided in Rule 5 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Form 30. United
States v. Killer Bros. Constr. Co., 505 F.2d
1031, 1034 (10th Cir. 1974); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Lefkowitz, 454 F. Supp. 59, 70 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
No such formal writing was filed in
the instant case. The reference to the death
of the plaintiff in the pleadings is not
sufficient to trigger the running of the 90
day time period.
Likewise,

in

Pol gov

v.

Anderson,

45

F.R.D.

(E.D.N.Y. 1968), the court held:
A statement made in passing curing a
deposition is not "a statement of the fact
of death: within the meaning of Rule 25.
See Official Form 50 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Substitution may be made prior to
service cf the statement. 4 Moore's Federal
Practice
25.-02, p. 62 (1967 Supp.).

23
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Attorneys are sometimes so harassed during
the course of a litigation that they may well
overlook an informal suggestion of death.
When the consequences to the client of a
slightly delayed reaction may be severe and
the burden of providing formal notice is
slight, insistence on the observance of
procedural ritual is justified.
Similarly, an answer to interrogatory is not a proper
suggestion of death:
The incidental mention of the deaths in
answers to interrogatories does not appear to
this Court to have started the 90-day period
running. Federal Form 30 provides an example
of the proper suggestion? the answers to
interrogatories cited by defendants do not
rise to the required level of formality.
Acri v. Int. Ass'n of Mach. & Aero. Wkrs., 5 95 F.Supp 32 6, 330
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
No proper suggestion of death was ever made.

A passing

reference to death in an unrelated motion is insufficient.
answer to interrogatory is insufficient.

An

The rules contemplate a

formal pleading specifically referring to the provisions of Rule
25.

See Connelly v. Rathien, 547 P.2d

dismissal was proper because
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(Utah 976) where

"notice of death was duly made of

record pursuant to Rule 25(a), U.R.C.P.";

Nat. Eouic. Rental

Ltd. v. Whitecraft Unl. Inc., 75 F.R.D. 507

(E.D.N.Y.1977)(ser-

vice

of

notice

to

file

claim

against

estate

is

net

proper

suggestion of death).
C.

No Personal Service Was Made Pursuant to Rule 25.
Rule

25(a)(1) recuires

service

of

the

suggestion of

death to be made "upon persons not parties in the manner provided
in Rule

4 for the

service

cf a summons."
24

Rule

4, in turn,

requires personal service upon the executor or personal representative of the estate of George Schoney.
parties

for whom

Rules

25(a)(1) and 4(d)(1) mandate

"The nonpersonal

the vsuccessors or representatives of the

service are evidently
deceased party'."

Rule 4(e)(1).

Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundryf 769 F.2d 958, 962

(4 Cir. 1985).

Defendant offered no evidence that it had served

the non-party,

i.e.

the estate of George Schoney.

Defendant

offered no evidence that an executor or personal representative
had ever been appointed for George Schoney's estate.
Service upon George Schoney's counsel was not sufficient .
Service on decedent's attorney above was
inadequate.
The attorney's agency to act
ceases with the death of his client, see
Restatement (Second) of Agency
120(1)(1958)
and he has no power to continue or terminate
an action on his own initiative. Because the
attorney is neither a party nor a legal
successor or representative of the estate, he
has no authority to move for substitution
under Rule 25(a)(1), as the courts have
repeatedly recognized." Fariss v. Lunchburg
Foundry, supra, 769 F.2d at 962.
Also holding

that the deceased's

attorney

"is not a

representative of the deceased party in the sense contemplated
by Rule 25(a)(1)" is Rende v. Kav, 415 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See also Brown v. -MUStain, 30 Fed.

Rules Serv. 2d 534 (4 Cir.

1980)(decedent's attorney not a party or successor to party who
can file suggestion of death); Al-Jurdi v. Rochefelbs, 88 F.R.D.
244 (W.D.N.Y.1980)(service must be made on estate unless estate's
attorney agrees and is authorized to acceot service of process.)
Because

George

Schoney' s

attorney
25

does

not

automatically

represent his estate, defendant has never properly served George
Schoney's estate.
POINT <
DEFENDANT'S OFFER OF JUDGMENT DID NOT MOOT
THE SCHONEY'S CLAIMS
A.

The Trial Court Dismissed All the Schoney's Claims Because
Defendant Offered to Rescind the Contract and Pay Restitution in the Amount of the Purchase Price Plus Interest.
Defendant made an oral offer of judgment at the summary

judgment hearing (Tr. at p. 13).
calculated

by returning

interest.

the money paid

(Tr. at p. 19).

return

of

the money

"moot"

all

their

The amount was $4,000 and was
by the Schoney's plus

Defendant seemed

the

Schoneys

damage

claims.

paid, plus
(Id.).

to argue

that

interest, would
The

trial

court

apparently agreed and held that the Schoneys could never recover
more than the $4,000 offered.
E.

The Schonevs
Instead Tnev
Damages.
The

(Tr. at p. 51).

Did Not Seek Rescission and
Souant to Affirm the Contract

Schoney's

Fifth

Amended

Complaint

Restitution;
and Recover
never

sought

recision and a refund of the money they had paid.

Instead, they

sought interest on the money they paid

for delay in

(damages

building the Mountain View Mausoleum); the difference in value
between

the

mausoleum

as

shown

and

the

mausoleum

as

built

(damages) and their share of the money earned by defendant in
renting the cemetery chapel (damages for loss cf use). Additionally, the Schoney's sought an accounting cf trust funds, which
does not depend on a finding of breach cf contract.
also

sought

damages

for

buying
25

substitute

The Schoneys

mausoleum

spaces

("cover" damages)
distress.

and damages

for their mental

and

emotional

Every remedy sought (except the trust accounting) was

based on damages for breach of contract or tort.

The Schoneys

made no request for rescission of the contract.
C.

Election of Remedies Is Up to the Schoneys, Not Defendant
and the Trial Court.
Ey offering rescission, defendant attempted to force an

election of remedies on the Schoneys.
it is cheaper
account

for

Obviously, defendant feels

to give the Schoneys their money

building

an

inferior mausoleum,

back than to

renting

out

the

cemetery chapel, abusing trust funds and obligations, and for
mental distress caused by
mausoleum.

the lengthy delay

in building

the

However, defendants are not allowed the option of

choosing the least expensive remedy.

If a plaintiff's damages

exceed the purchase price, the plaintiff is free to seek damages.
A

plaintiff

is entitled

"free of fraud or imposition."

to an election

of

remedies

Anoelos v. First Interstate Bank

of Utah, 571 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah I9E3).
It is axiomatic that where a civil wrong
gives rise to two or more causes of action,
the choice of remedy is vested in the victim,
not in the wrongdoer
. . . It does not lie
in the mouth of tne wrongdoer to oemana tnet
his victim oe limitea to tnat cause cf action
wnicn is most oeneficial to tne wronc-ooer.
Gherman

v.

Colburn,

140 Cal. Rptr.

230, 343

(App. Ct.

(Emphasis in the original.)
The choice cf remedies beloncs to the one who
has been defrauded and may not be forced upon
him by the wrongdoer.

27

1S77)

Moore & Co. v. Williams, 657 P.2d 984, 988 (Colo App. 1982).
also Mills v. Brown, 568 S.W.2d 100 (Tenn. 1978)

See

(purchaser's

choice whether to seek rescission or damages; not up to vendor);
Kino v. Lindlay, 697 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. App. 1985) ("Defendant may
not dictate to a plaintiff which remedy he should pursue").
D.

There was No Evidence that the Schoney's Damages Could Not
Exceed $4 , 000 .
There was no basis for the trial court to conclude as a

matter of law that the damages alleged would not exceed $4,000.
Damages such as mental and emotional distress are not capable of
ascertainment on summary judgment anyway, and must be left to a
jury.

Thus, defendant's offer of settlement was no basis for

dismissing the Schoney's complaint.
A procedure similar to that of Judge Moffat's was found
reversible error in Jarrett v. G.L. Harper & Sons, Inc., 235 S.E.
2d

362

(W. Va.

1977).

After

picking a

jury,

the

defendant

confessed judgment in the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket
expenses.

After colloquy with plaintiff's

court dismissed the case.

counsel, the trial

The appellate court reversed:

The record discloses no explanation about how
the trial court arrived at his decision to
force acceptance of this confession of judgment upon plaintiffs. . . [W]hen a defendant's offer of judgment only partially
satisfies the plaintiff's claim for damages
and plaintiff either rejects the tender or
accepts it as part payment only, the court
must consider the offer withdrawn and submit
the case to the jury, whereas here one has
been demanded.
Id. at 363, 364.
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Because

the

offer

of

judgment

was

only

a

partial

satisfaction and w_„ rejected by the Schoneys, the trial court
had no choice but to send the matter to a jury.
E.

The Schoneys'
Complaint
Should Not Have Been Discussed
if their Damages Could Not Exceed $4,000.
Assuming

for

sake

of

argument

that

the

Even

Schoneys'

damages could not exceed $4,000, defendant's offer of judgment
could not form the basis for dismissing their complaint.
dismissal

The

deprived the Schoneys of both their cause of action

and the $4,000 which defendant offered. An offer of judgment "is
neither a defense to an action nor a bar to further prosecution
of a suit."

Kat2 Drue Co. v. Comm. Standard Ins., 647 S.W.2d

831, 840 (Mo. App. 1963).

"Defendant's reliance upon its offer

of judgment as constituting an acceptable basis for the grant of
summary
action

judgment
and

does

is misplaced.
not bar the

[Citation omitted].
2d 671, 876

[It] is not a defense to an
further prosecution

of a suit.

Killer v United Security Ins. Co., 496 S.W.

(Mo. App. 1973).

An offer of judgment is not a

pleading, deposition, admission or affidavit which will support
summary judgment.

Id.

What Judge Moffat did must be distinguished

from the

procedure occasionally used in class actions of offering judgment
in excess of the named plaintiff's damages.
class certification
trial.

is denied

This is done after

and is done to avoid

a useless

In those cases, the named plaintiff gets a judgment in

his favor for the full amount of his individual damages.

Even

then, 'a court may not impose upon a plaintiff a settlement that
29

deprives him of relief to which he could be entitled after
trial.

[Citation omitted]."

(2d Cir. 1983).

Kline v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 405

Part of the relief sought in a class action is

class certification.

Thus, a judgment in favor of an indivi-

dual named plaintiff must allow for appeal of the denial of
class certification.

Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106

(5th Cir. 1978) affirmed sub. nom.

Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v

Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S. Ct. 1166, 63 L. Ed.2d 427 (1980).
This

prevents

accountability

a
by

large
paying

defendant
off

from

the

named

avoiding

class-wide

plaintiff's

claims

through an unaccepted offer of judgment.
In this case, however, defendant used its unaccepted
offer of judgment to avoid both class liability and liability
to the Schoneys.

This approach deprives the Schoneys of both

the offered judgment and their causes of action.

No plausible

reasoning can support this result.
DATED this

/Q

day of

'' ^ f c ^ Y *

, 1989.

DANIEL F. BERTCH1

•1-This brief is submitted in its current form pursuant to
the order of March 7, 1989. Appellant submits it under protest
that the order is incorrect and that the hearing panel will be
unfairly hampered by the abbreviated nature of the brief.
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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 78-2-2(3)(j), as amended, and
78-2-2(4), as amended.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff Erma J. Schoney (hereinafter "plaintiff")
appeals from the trial court decision granting summary judgment
to defendants Memorial Estates, Inc. and Memorial Estates
Cemetery Development Corp. ("Memorial Estates") for failure to
present in the record sufficient substantive material and
relevant evidence to support her causes of action. The trial
court found that Memorial Estates did not breach its contract
with plaintiff and was in compliance with Utah State statutes,
and that plaintiff's other claims were time-barred. Plaintiff
further appeals the trial court decision dismissing George K.
Schoney from the case for failure to substitute a party after
his death was suggested on the record, pursuant to Rule 25 of
the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that plaintiff failed to present in the record
substantive material and relevant evidence to support her
causes of action and controvert the material and relevant
evidence presented by Memorial Estates in its Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2.
George K. Schoney was properly dismissed as a
party plaintiff after more than 90 days had elapsed after his
death was suggested on the record.
3.
In light of plaintiff's request for
trial setting, the trial court did not abuse its
when it struck plaintiff's complaint and entered
favor of Memorial Estates under Rule 37(d) based
failure to respond to discovery:
a)
b)
c)
d)

an expedited
discretion
judgment in
on plaintiff's

Within 30 days;
Before the discovery cut-off;
Prior to defendants' motion for sanctions; and,
Plaintiff's failure to either request additional
time, object or explain the failure to answer.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Section 22-4-1, Utah Code Annotated (before 1983 amendment)
Section 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated, as amended
Rule 25(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

The above rules and statutes are set out in full in the
appendix hereto.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff has sued Memorial Estates for damages she
claims arise out of her purchase of a pre-need contract for
space in a mausoleum which was to be built in the future.

She

claims that Memorial Estates intentionally and fraudulently
delayed construction of the now completed mausoleums.

She

alleges that the buildings do not appear as she believed they
would appear when she purchased them.

She further claims that

the purchase funds were not properly accounted for and held in
trust during the period of construction.

Finally, she alleges

that Memorial Estates wrongfully failed to disinter and move
her father's remains when she requested it.
Memorial Estates claims they have either fully
performed all duties under the contract, or that they were able
to perform had performance been requested.

Memorial Estates

further asserts that the claim that they failed to disinter
Mr. Wheeler is spurious and time-barred.
Plaintif^appealed the determinations by the trial court
that:

(1) Memorial Estates was entitled to summary judgment on

all of the causes of action contained in plaintiff's Fifth
Amended Complaint for the reason that there was an absence of
evidence to withstand defendants' motion; and, (2) George K.
Schoney's dismissal from the action pursuant to Rule 25 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was proper, due to his death and
the failure to substitute a party in his stead.

-3-

It is defendants1 position that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion and (1) plaintiff failed to show
sufficient evidence to support her case and withstand the facts
and argument supporting the Motion for Summary Judgment; (2)
George K. Schoney's death was suggested on the record without
substitution and he was accordingly properly dismissed; and,
(3) the court acted within its discretion in striking
plaintiff's complaint for failure to answer defendants1
interrogatories.
improper.

Plaintiff has not argued that dismissal was

Plaintiff has therefore waived any argument to the

contrary.
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Plaintiff and George K. Schoney originally filed a
complaint on June 17, 1982, alleging:
a)
b)
c)
d)

A class action;
Tortious bad faith;
Breach of contract;
Fraud; and,

e)

Violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices

Act. (R. at 2-11)
Memorial Estates filed an Answer denying the
allegations in support of each cause of action. (R. at 39-44)
Plaintiff and George K. Schoney pursued their discovery from
1982 to 1988.

Plaintiff and George K. Schoney amended their

complaint June 8, 1983 to allege:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)
1)

Tortious bad faith (failure to complete mausoleum);
Breach of contract (failure to complete mausoleum);
Fraudulent conveyance;
Violation of Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act;
Breach of contract to provide chapel;
Breach of trust;
Breach of statutory trust;
Invasion of trust corpus;
Fraud;
Failure to establish a statutory trust;
Outrage and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (failure to complete mausoleum); and,
Class allegations.

(R. at 292-308) (Appendix, Exhibit "A")
Plaintiff alleged the class action was certified,
(R. at 202-204), but when evidence failed to support the
certification, it was decertified on June 24, 1984.

(R. at

704-705)
A.

Summary Judgment
On December 29, 1987, defendants moved for summary

judgment. (R. at 1200-1225, 1189-1190, 1191-1193, 1198-1199)
(Appendix, Exhibits "B," "C," "DH and "E")

The motion

demonstrated there was insufficient evidence to support any of
plaintiff's causes of action.

Therefore, because there was no

genuine issue of material fact at issue, defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, filing an affidavit
raising new issues. (R. at 1262-1265) (Appendix, Exhibit "FM)
The court denied defendants1 motion and granted plaintiff leave
to amend the complaint and to address the new issues and narrow
the issues before the Court.

The court, on its own Motion,

continued the trial date. (R. at 1301)

(Appendix, Exhibit "G")

On January 26, 1988, plaintiff filed her Fifth Amended
Complaint, alleging:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)
j)
k)

Breach of contract for delayed performance;
Breach of warranty;
Common law fraud;
Violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act;
Breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
interference with easement;
Breach of common law trust;
Breach of statutory trust;
Invasion of trust corpus;
Failure to establish a statutory trust;
Outrage and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (disinterment of Mr. Wheeler); and,
Class allegations,

(R. at 1312-1342) (Appendix, Exhibit "H")
On February 11, 1988, defendants answered again and denying the
allegations in support of the Fifth Amended Complaint.
(R. at 1343-1357)
Defendants had offered judgment in the sum of
$4,000.00, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure on January 8, 1988, after the Fifth Amended Complaint
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was filed. (R. at 1294-1295)

The tender was renewed

February 11, 1988. (R. at 1359-1359)

Neither offer was

accepted.
On February 17, 1988, pursuant to plaintiff's express
request for an expedited trial date, (R. at 1338-1341), the
court ordered a scheduling conference. (R. at 1360)

Although

plaintiff's attorneys did not appear at the scheduling
conference and were not available by telephone, (R. at 1360),
the court granted the request for an expedited schedule and
set the following schedule:
Discovery cutoff, June 10, 1988;
Motion cutoff, June 17, 1988;
Final pre-trial, June 21, 1988; and,
Trial, July 6 and 7, 1988.
Memorial Estates submitted Defendants' Fourth Set of
Interrogatories to plaintiff by mail on April 29, 1988,
addressing the new claims raised in plaintiff's Fifth Amended
Complaint. (R. at 1361-1362)

Plaintiff never responded, either

by answer, objection or request for more time prior to
defendants' motion for sanctions.

On June 14, 1988, Memorial

Estates moved for Summary Judgment, together with a Motion to
Strike plaintiff's complaint and enter judgment against
plaintiff, based upon plaintiff's failure to answer the
interrogatories within the cut-off period and faced with an
expedited trial setting of July 6.
The parties agreed to extend the time to hear pre-trial
motions to June 21, 1987. (R. at 1365)
-7-

On June 21st, at the hearing on defendants' motions,
plaintiff's attorneys hand-delivered to counsel for Memorial
Estates plaintiff's purported answers to Defendants' Fourth Set
of Interrogatories.

Memorial Estates did not have the benefit

of said interrogatory answers in connection with its Motion for
Summary Judgment or its preparation for trial.
The court, after hearing argument, granted both
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike.
(R. at 1377-1379) (Appendix, Exhibit "I")
B.

Death of Plaintiff George K. Schoney.
At the June 21, 1988 hearing, the court also dismissed

George K. Schoney as a party, inasmuch as his death had been
suggested on the record in Plaintiff's Answers to
Interrogatories, (copies of Plaintiff's Answers to
Interrogatories were filed with defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment on December 29, 1987?) (R. at 1217)

Thereafter, no

party was substituted for him, pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. at 1377-1379)
Plaintiff argues in her brief that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment on only a portion of her
claims.

She claims the record contains sufficient evidence to

preclude the granting of summary judgment with respect to the
following causes of action:
1.

Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust);

2.

Breach of contract by delay;
-8-

3.

Breach of warranty regarding appearance of
mausoleum;

4.

Breach of contract for availability of chapel;

5.

Common law fraud; and,

6.

Intentional infliction of emotional distress for
refusal to disinter Mr, Wheeler.

Plaintiff further argues that the death of George K. Schoney
was not properly suggested on the record, and therefore, he
should not have been dismissed.
The pleadings contain no significant admissions
regarding material facts.

The only material facts which were

drawn to the attention of the trial court in connection with
the dispositive motions are those stated in the attachments to
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment and in the affidavits of John MacKay, Kenith M. Hughes
and Warren J. Christensen supporting defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment and those stated in the Affidavit of Erma
Schoney opposing said Motion.
The alleged statements of fact in Appellant's Brief
(excepting those statements from plaintiff's affidavit) were
not raised in connection with defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment filed December 27, 1987, defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment filed June 14, 1988, or any other proceeding.
These statements are not supported by the Record on Appeal.
majority of plaintiff's alleged facts are taiten from the
-9-

A

unfiled and unpublished depositions of plaintiff, George K.
Schoney and other individuals, which plaintiff failed to make
available to the trial court as required by Rule.5 4-501 and
4-502 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Furthermore, these depositions have not been made part of the
record on appeal by plaintiff, as required by Rule 11 of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
Memorial Estates therefore submits the following
statement of facts which were properly before the trial court
and supported by the record on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Clinton and Anna Wheeler, plaintiff's parents, owned
four ground burial lots located at Memorial Estates Redwood
Road Cemetery.

(R. at 1191-1192)

On December 29, 1973,"the

Wheelers gave two of their ground burial lots to plaintiff and
her husband, George Schoney. (R. at 1169, 1192)

The Wheelers

and Schoneys subsequently traded in their ground burial lots as
down payments toward the purchase of pre-need mausoleum spaces
from Memorial Estates.

(R. at 1192)

Plaintiff and her husband

entered into the "Mausoleum Estate Agreement" (hereinafter
"Agreement") on January 29, 1974, made the first payment under
the Agreement in February 1974 and continued making monthly
payments for 36 months until the contract price was paid in
full in January of 1977.

(R. at 65, 111-112, 1192)

Clinton Wheeler died August 13, 1974, prior to the time
that either Memorial Estatefs mausoleum at Redwood Road or at
Mountain Vi€>w were completed, and his funeral services were
-10-

held at the Memorial Estates1 Chapel, located at 5858 South 900
East, Murray, Utah.

(R. at 241, 1192, 1203)

No crypt was then

available at the Mountain View mausoleum, and so, at the
request of the family, his remains were interred at the
Mountain View location in a ground burial plot. (R. at 1192)
This was in accordance with the Agreement which provided that
if a client died before the construction of the pre-need
mausoleum crypt was completed, Memorial Estates would offer an
alternative mausoleum location or interment in a ground burial
plot.

If the latter option was chosen, the family would have

the right to have the deceased's remains relocated to the
designated crypt, upon its completion, at Memorial Estates'
expense. (R. at 10, 409)
Mrs. Wheeler passed away on May 22, 1982.

Memorial

Estates1 services and facilities were not requested, and
Mrs. Wheeler was interred at a mausoleum having no relationship
with defendants (Sunset Lawn).

At the family's request, Mr.

Wheeler's remains were disinterred from the Mountain View
ground plot vault and re-interred at the mausoleum at Sunset
Lawn on the day of Mrs. Wheeler's funeral.

(R. at 1192, 1271)

Plaintiff and her husband, George K. Schoney, also
purchased mausoleum spaces at the mausoleum when her parents,
the Wheelers had purchased spaces. (R. at 244)

In 1976,

Memorial Estates completed a 128 space mausoleum at the
Memorial Estates' Redwood Cemetery.

The Redwood Mausoleum is

part of Memorial Estates' pre-need program.
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The mausoleum

remains only partially filled. (R. at 173, 352)
crypts will be added as the need arises.

Additional

(R. at 408)

In April

1985, Memorial Estates also completed a 276 space mausoleum at
the Memorial Estates1 Mountain View Cemetery, where plaintiff
claims she wanted her spaces to be.

Spaces have also been

available in this mausoleum at all times since completion, but
further additions will be built as the need may arise. (R. at
74, 173, 1192)

In addition, Memorial Estates has held separate

and reserved specific mausoleum spaces for plaintiff and her
husband at its Redwood Road Cemetery since at least January
1977.

(R. at 1191-1193)
Plaintiff's husband, George K. Schoney, died

February 19, 1986, after Memorial Estates had completed
construction of both the Redwood Road and the Mountain View
mausoleums.

However, George K. Schoney was also interred at

the mausoleum space at Sunset Lawn as had^plaintiff's parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Wheeler. (R. at 1217-1218)

Plaintiff has never

requested the use of Memorial Estates' facilities and services
in connection with any lot, space or contract right owned by
her. (R. at 583, 1192)

She has made it clear that with respect

to Mr. Schoney's death, or her own, (R. at 1219-1221), she has
never intended to utilize the mausoleum space available at
either Mountain View or Redwood Road, or Memorial Estates'
chapels.

Plaintiff had never made a request upon Memorial

Estates for the use of a chapel or other facilities either at,
or following Mr. Schoney's death.
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(R. at 1221)

Memorial Estates has always been ready, willing, and
able to provide plaintiff with interment spaces in any of its
completed mausoleums.

Further, Memorial Estates has always

been ready, willing, and able to provide plaintiff with the use
of a chapel upon request as provided by the contract. (R. at
10, 146, 583)
By statute, Memorial Estates is required to retain
certain funds for cemetery endowment care.

There are

sufficient funds for the cemeteries and mausoleums operated by
Memorial Estates at both the Redwood and Mountain View
locations.

This fact has not been contested by plaintiff.

(R. at 353, 358-359, 1199)

Memorial Estates has complied fully

and completely with the statutes and regulations of the State
of Utah regarding cemeteries and mausoleums.

(R. at 1190)

In

addition, Memorial Estates1 endowment care contains sufficient
funds to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 8-4-2.
(R. at 1199)
The only documents containing averments of fact which
were part of the record before the trial court were
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admission,
affidavits and the depositions of Delmar Holt, Jr. and Richard
Bentley, (both unsealed) as set forth below:
Document

Record
Page No(s).

Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set
of Interrogatories to Defendant
Memorial Estates, Inc.

45-49

-13-

Document

Record
Page No(s).

Answers to Second Set of
Plaintiffs' Interrogatories

50-108

Affidavit of Kenith Hughes

141-145

Counter Affidavit of George Schoney

148-149

Affidavit of Kenith Hughes

173-176

Answers to Defendants1 First Set of
Interrogatories

236-250

Answers to Defendants' Request for
Admissions

251-256

Answers to Defendants' Second
Request for Admissions

352-355

Answers to Defendants' Second Set of
Interrogatories

356-364

Affidavit of Delmar Holt, Jr.

405-406

Affidavit of Kenith Hughes

407-409

Affidavit of Kenith Hughes

582-584

Affidavit of Paul Moore

992-994

Affidavit of John MacKay

1189-1190

Affidavit of Kenith M. Hughes

1191-1193

Affidavit o£ Warren J. Christensen

1198-1199

Affidavit oE Erma Schoney

1262-1265

Affidavit of Erma Schoney

1271-1274

Deposition of Delmar Holt, Jr.

1399

Deposition of Richard Bentley

1400

Assertions in the Statement of Facts submitted by
plaintiff appear to raise questions regarding such matters as
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representations by Memorial Estates1 salespeople, release of
Mr. Wheeler's remains for removal to Sunset Lawn and
discussions plaintiff alleges took place with unnamed persons
on the mausoleum construction sites.
assertions come solely from

As stated above, those

unfiled depositions, and cannot be

rebutted by facts contained in the record.

Unfortunately,

those assertions will have been reviewed before the arguments
pointing out why those assertions are not properly before the
Court.

Therefore, defendants, submit that in the event the

Court finds said assertions worthy of consideration, for any
reason, the depositions should be located, filed and reviewed
in their entirety, in which case, the Court will find that (1)
there is no foundation for many assertions, and (2) the
assertions do not rise to the level of issues of material fact.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient relevant

evidence to the trial court to withstand defendants' motion for
summary judgment with the affidavits submitted in support
thereof.
2.

The trial court properly entered judgment against

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and plaintiff has failed to argue that said entry of
judgment was improper.
3.

The suggestion of George K. Schoney's death, made

by plaintiff's interrogatory answer in the course of this
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matter was sufficient to satisfy Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure,
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT FACTS TO THE LOWER COURT
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT AND FAILED TO CONTROVERT THE FACTS
SUBMITTED BY MEMORIAL ESTATES.
Plaintiff does not address the trial court's ruling on
five of the causes of action in Plaintiff's Fifth Amended
Complaint, (R. at 12-42), apparently accepting the trial
court's ruling on those causes of action.
Those causes of action that are argued in plaintiff's
brief from Plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint include the
following:

"Breach of Contract for Delayed Performance/"

"Breach of Warranty" regarding mausoleum appearance, "Common
Law Fraud," "Breach of Contract" for availability of chapel;
"Breach of Utah Code Ann. § 22-4-1 (75% trust)," and
"Outrageous & Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" for
refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler.

With respect to each of those

causes of action, plaintiff failed to show sufficient evidence
to support the claim, and failed to controvert those facts
submitted by Memorial Estates in defense of the claim.
A.
Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that Memorial
Estates had breached the Schoney's contract.
Plaintiff claims that Memorial Estates failed to
perform its contractual obligations.
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The facts in the record

reveal that Memorial Estates has fully performed its
contractual obligations.
Those obligations are:
1)

To provide rights to mausoleum crypts for Mr.

and Mrs. Schoney;
2)

To construct a mausoleum;

3)

To bury, disinter and place remains in

mausoleum if space was not constructed at time of
death;
4)

To make available a full service chapel; andf

5)

To place $20.00 in Trust "A" and $20.00 in

Trust "B" to be applied to endowment care.
Performance was as follows:
1)

Memorial Estates is holding two spaces for

plaintiff at the Redwood Road mausoleum, and has
space available at the Mountain View mausoleum, as
well, which is available for plaintiff.
2)

Memorial Estates has constructed two

mausoleums.
3)

Plaintiff chose to inter her husband at Sunset

Lawn and has no intention to be interred at
Memorial Estates.
4)

Plaintiff chose not to use a Memorial Estates

provided chapel for her husband's funeral and has
no intention to use a Memorial Estates' chapel at
her own funeral.
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5)

Memorial Estates has an endowment care fund

which meets the requirements of the State of Utah
and which exceeds the requirements of Trust "A"
and Trust "B".
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
summary judgment.

Memorial Estates has always been ready,

willing, and able to perform each of its duties pursuant to the
contract entered into with plaintiff. (R. at 10, 74, 146, 583,
1192-1193)

Even if the contrary had been true, no evidence of

damage could have been presented at trial.
B.

Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is
without merit.

Plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty is based upon
the allegation that the mausoleums constructed by the
defendants are different in appearance and quality from the
appearance and quality the plaintiff believed they would have,
based upon an artist's rendering plaintiff claimed was shown to
her at the time she purchased her pre-need contract.

First,

The record contains no evidence of representations or
warranties made by the defendants with respect to the
appearance or quality of the mausoleum to be built pursuant to
the pre-need contract.
finished in 1976.

Second, the first mausoleum was

The claim for breach of warranty was first

constructed in January 1988.

The mausoleum appearance was

obvious to the plaintiff from 1976, and therefore, she was on
notice regarding the appearance and quality she now complains
-18-

of/ 12 years prior to the first filing of this cause of
action.

Third, plaintiff has admitted she is not offended by

the appearance of the Mountain View cemetery.

(R. at 353-358)

No issue has been raised to the effect that the appearance is
inferior in any way.

Finally, the statute of limitations had

run long before the Fifth Amended Complaint was filed
commencing in 1976 and running in 1980.

(Utah Code Ann. §

78-12-25, § 78-12-25.5, as amended)
C.

Because plaintiff failed to allege the elements of
fraud, or raise issues sufficient to justify a
finding of fraud.

In order to recover for fraud plaintiff must
specifically plead and prove the following:

(1) that a

representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) recklessly made knowing
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did, in fact, rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act; (9) to its injury and
damage.

Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978);

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75
(1952).

In addition, the plaintiff must plead the conduct

constituting fraud with particularity, (Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 9(b)), and the evidence of fraud must be "clear
and convincing."

Berkeley Bank v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801

(Utah 1980).
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Plaintiff argues that the fraudulent conduct relates to
defendants1 representations that they would perform in the
future by building mausoleums.

Plaintiff's argument fails

because there was no misrepresentation.

Memorial Estates has

built two mausoleums and has more than adequate crypt space
available.

Plaintiff's argument also fails because she has

pled the allegations of fraud insufficiently.

Because Memorial

Estates' representation relates to future performance.

The

party pleading fraud must show that the defendants did not
intend to perform at the time the promise was made.

Rice,

Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt ^ake County, 646 P.2d 696, 698
(Utah 1982).

A subsequent change of mind or nonperformance is

insufficient to prove fraud.

Id.

Plaintiff failed to show how

Memorial Estates did not"intend to perform at the time the
promise was made.

Plaintiff, in fact, would never be able to

show Memorial Estates did not intend to peform, since Memorial
Estates has in fact performed the promise.

Finally, it should

be noted that plaintiff never presented a submission which
would raise the issue of any damage having been caused, even if
her claim could be proven.
Those facts argued in the Brief of Appellant are not
supported in the Record.

Plaintiff does not point out a single

fact from the Record from which it can be inferred that
Memorial Estates did not intend to perform each of its
obligations under the contract, at the time the contract was
entered into.
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D,

Plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the
chapel was not available for her use.

As set forth in the facts above. Memorial Estates has
always been ready, willing, and able to provide a chapel for
plaintiff's use.

Plaintiff has never presented a submission to

controvert the affidavit of Kenith Hughes on this issue.
Plaintiff has never made request or demand on Memorial Estates
for the use of a chapel.

(R. at 583)

In her Response to

Defendants1 First Request for Admissions, plaintiff admitted:
Request No. 9:
Admit that as of the date Plaintiffs
filed their complaint they had not at
any time requested the defendant to
provide them the use of the chapel.
Response:
Deny in part. Plaintiffs have not
requested chapel space for their own
burial.
(R. at 254)

See also Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories,

d a t e d August 1 3 , 1987, 11118 and 1 4 . )
Not only is the evidence uncontroverted that a chapel
was available and that plaintiff never asked to use the chapel;
additionally, the plaintiff, made a submission which would raise
the issue of any damage having been caused even if this claim
could be proven.
E.

Memorial Estates has committed no breach of trust.

As revealed by the affidavits of John MacKay, Warren
Christensen and Kenith Hughes, Memorial Estates has complied
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with all the conditions required of it by state statute
regarding the maintenance of any endowment trust funds.
Memorial Estates is audited on a yearly basis and these audits
have revealed that Memorial Estates maintains the necessary
money available for mausoleum and cemetery construction.
(R. at 1190, 1199)
In addition. Section 22-4-1 of the Utah Code provided,
at the time of acts complained of, that the 75% trust
requirement did not apply to cemetery lots, vaults, mausoleum
crypts, niches, cemetery burial privileges and cemetery space.
The Schoneys had made their final payments in 1977.

At that

time, there was no requirement for any of that money paid to be
set aside in trust pursuant to Section 22-4-1.

In 1983, the

legislature amended that section to include mausoleum space,
but that provision is not applicable to the cause of action in
this appeal because the last payment had been made six years
before the amendment.

Therefore, there can be no violation of

that section as alleged by plaintiff.
The purpose of the 75% trust requirement is to ensure
that funds are available to provide the services promised in
the pre-need contract.

In this case, the mausoleum promised

was constructed, the construction trust requirement, if any,
expired upon construction.

Further, the facts reveal that

Memorial Estates is in full compliance with all statutory
endowment care requirements and, therefore, plaintiff cannot
claim she has been damaged in any way.
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Plaintiff's contract contains references to Trust "A"
and Trust "B", endowment care trusts into which $20 of
plaintiff's purchase funds were to be placed in each.

At the

time the present parties who own and manage the defendant
corporations first became involved/ which was after the time
the plaintiff entered into her purchase contract/ but before
she paid the last payment/ Trust "A" was insolvent.

Trust "B",

however, contains, at the present time, more than the
requirement in the contract for "A"and "B"/ and the additional
endowment fund required by the State also exceeds the
requirement in the contract regarding Trust "A" and Trust "B".
In any event/ the plaintiff has made no submission of any
evidence to raise the issue of damages having been caused/ even
if her claim can be proven.
F.

Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must fail.

In order to recover under an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must show that
Memorial Estates' conduct was "outrageous and intolerable."
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah.2d 289/ 358 P.2d 344 (1961).

The

facts in this case/ even as alleged by plaintiff/ do not rise
to this standard.

Plaintiff complains that Memorial Estates

refused to disinter Mr. Wheeler's remains which had been
temporarily placed in a vault in a ground burial plot because
the family wished to eventually use the as then incompleted
Mountain View mausoleum/ rather than the completed Redwood Road
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mausoleum.

The only fact in the record is that Mr. Wheeler's

remains were promptly disinterred after the request was made
and they were placed in the mausoleum at Sunset Lawn on the
very day of his wife's funeral service.

Thereforef as a matter

of law, this claim cannot stand.
In addition, the allegations in the pleadings referring
to the disinterment of Mr. Wheeler state the disinterment
occurred on or before May 22, 1982.

The longest possible

statute of limitation period that could apply is four years
from the occurrence, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25, as amended,
even though plaintiff alleged this claim as an intentional
tort, and the period could be less than four years.
was first made in January 1988.

The claim

Because the claim was first

raised five years and seven months after the occurrence,
Memorial Estates was not notified of plaintiff's intent to
raise the claim.

The claim is barred by the statute of

limitations.
Plaintiff claims that this claim should relate back to
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
contained in the Second Amended Complaint, filed in 1983.

The

facts upon which the claim in the Second Amended Complaint
(R. at 308) was alleged were those plaintiff claims amount to
intentional or wilful delay of construction of the mausoleum.
The failure to disinter claim stands on completely separate and
distinct factual allegations.

The facts upon which the claim
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in the Fifth Amended Complaint (R. at 1325-1326) is alleged
concern a supposed refusal to disinter Mr. Wheeler, a claim
never pled prior to the filing of the Fifth Amended Complaint.
The identity between the labels on the two claims is not
sufficient to tie the new set of facts in the Fifth Amended
Complaint to the date of the Second Amended Complaint.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling
as a matter of law that plaintiff could not prevail upon any of
these claims, based upon the record before the trial court.
II
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ARE MOOT BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF'S FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT
BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO ANSWER DEFENDANTS1
FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES IN A TIMELY FASHION.
THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN APPEALED.
Plaintiff's brief does not contest the trial court's
order granting defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiff's Fifth
Amended Complaint.

The ruling on that Motion, and consequent

entry of judgment for Memorial Estates on all issues, renders
all of plaintiff's arguments on appeal moot.
The original complaint was filed in 1982.

Defendants'

summary judgment motion, on December 29, 1987, demonstrated
that the conditions alleged in the complaint could not be
proven. By way of response to defendants' December 29, 1987
Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff requested and received
leave of the court to file another amended complaint.

It was

filed January 26, 1988, over five and one-half years after the
original complaint. (R. at 1312)

The Fifth Amended Complaint
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raised new issues and at least five new and additional causes
of actionf to wit:

"Breach of Warranty," "Unjust Enrichment,"

"Interference with Contract," "Breach of Common Law Trust," and
"Outrage and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
(Disinterment of Mr. Wheeler)".

The new causes of action

required additional discovery by defendants, but the plaintiff
had also requested that the court set an expedited trial date.
The court granted the request and set the date of July 6, 1988
to commence trial.
On April 29, 1988, Memorial Estates submitted
Defendants' Fourth Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiff by
mail.

The principal fact which had changed from the dates of

the first and second complaints to the date of the fifth
complaint had to do with defendants' construction of two
mausoleums.

Defendants' Fourth Set of Interrogatories

addressed issues concerning the construction and appearance of
those mausoleums, which were issues raised for the first time
in the plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint.
The last day to answer interrogatories in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 33(a) was June 1, 1988, only a
month and six days before trial.

The last day to respond to

all discovery, pursuant to the Court's scheduling order, was
June 10, 1988.

Counsel for Memorial Estates requested the

answers from counsel for plaintiff between June 2 and June 13
(Transcript of hearing, June 21, 1988 at 3), and, when no
answers were forthcoming, on June 14, 1988, Memorial Estates
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filed a Motion to strike plaintiff's Fifth Amended Complaint
and to enter judgment on behalf of Memorial Estates for reason
of plaintiff's failure to answer the interrogatories.
Purported answers to those interrogatories were
delivered to counsel for defendants at the time of hearing.

No

certificate regarding service or filing of complete
interrogatory answers is in the record.
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if a party fails to serve answers to
interrogatories:
The court in which the action is pending, on
motion, may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others, it may
take any action authorized under paragraphs
(A) (B) and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this
Rule.
Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides in part:
. . . dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by
default against the disobedient party; . . . .
In the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West
Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court
addressed a situation comparable to the one in the instant
matter.

In that case, as in this case, the court granted a

summary judgment and at the same time, granted judgment by
default as a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d).

Addressing the

issue of judgment by default as a sanction, the Court commented
on the amendment in 1972 which changed Rule 37(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure to correspond with the 1970 amendment
to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and quoted
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8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, page
807-812 with approval as follows:
Rule 37(d) allows the imposition of sanctions
against a party for especially serious
disregard of the obligations imposed upon him
by the discovery rules even though he has not
violated any court order . . . .
Until 1970,
the rule applied only if a failure by a party
was willful. This limitation has been
eliminated. In addition, the rule now says,
as Rule 37(b)(2) always has said, that the
court is to make "such orders with regard to
the failure as are just." Taken together,
these two changes mean that any failure of
the sort described in Rule 37(d) permits
invocation of the rule, regardless of the
reason for the failure, but that the court
has discretion about the sanction to be
imposed.
Gardner at 737.
In Gardner, the defendants contended the sanction was
inappropriate because they had served answers to the
interrogatories prior to the hearing on the motion for a
default judgment.

The court rejected that argument stating

that if a party fails to answer within the specified time under
the rule, that party has failed to answer and the court may
appropriately invoke the sanctions.
In Gardner, as in the instant matter, the party that
failed to answer also failed to object to the interrogatories,
to request additional time or to explain or justify the failure
to answer, and the Gardner Court ruled that the trial court was
justified in finding there was no reasonable excuse for the
failure to comply with Rule 33.

The Court further stated,

paraphrasing the case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v, Echols, 138 Ga. App. 593, 226 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1976):
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. • . there was no significance in the fact
plaintiff submitted answers to the propounded
questions before the hearing on defendant's
motion for sanctions. The court ruled once
the motion for sanctions has been filed/ the
opposing party may not preclude their
imposition by making a belated response in
the interim between the filing of the motion
for sanctions and the hearing on the
motion.
The Court reiterated that sanctions are appropriate
whether a party has moved pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2) for an
order compelling the other party to respond to discovery, or
not, and further stated:
The extreme sanction of default or dismissal
must be tempered by the careful exercise of
judicial discretion to ensure its imposition
is merited. Under Rule 37(d), sanctions are
justified without reference to whether the
unexcused failure to make discovery was
willful. The sanction of default judgment is
justified where there has been a frustration
of the judicial process vis., where the
failure to respond to discovery impeached
trial on the merits and makes it impossible
to ascertain whether the allegations of the
answer have any factual merit.
A defendant may not ignore with impunity the
requirements of Rules 33 and 34 and the
necessity to respond within 30 days, to
request additional time or to seek a
protective order under Rule 26(c). A party
to an action has a right to have the benefits
of discovery procedure promptly, not only in
order that he may have ample time to prepare
his case, but also in order to bring to light
facts which may entitle him to summary
judgment or induce settlement prior to trial.
Gardner at 738.
Gardner applies to the instant case because plaintiff's
failure to respond to the interrogatories impeded not only the
defendants' presentation of their Motion for Summary Judgment,
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but it also impeded preparation for trial on the merits and
prejudiced the defendants by effectively preventing defendants
from following up on their timely discovery request when trial
was set to commence only two weeks away.
Plaintiff's arguments are moot because the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in striking the plaintiff's
complaint and entering judgment in favor of Memorial Estates,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Plaintiff never appealed this decision and

accordinglyr it stands, thereby mooting plaintiff's appeal.
Ill
THE "FACTS" STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS WERE NOT BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT AND ARE NOT PART OF THE
RECORD ON APPEAL.
In plaintiff's brief, plaintiff alleges facts that were
not before the trial court and are not before this Court.
Plaintiff has cited almost exclusively to depositions that were
neither filed nor published, and were in fact not accessible to
the trial court judge.

The trial court judge was not apprised

of plaintiff's reliance on said alleged facts either on
defendants' December 27, 1987 Motion for Summary Judgment or
upon Defendants' January 14, 1988 Motion for Summary Judgment.
In Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d
634 (Utah App. 1987) this Court upheld the Utah Supreme Court's
denial of a motion to supplement the record on appeal to
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include depositions which had not been published in the trial
court.

In a concurring opinion, Judge Orme explains that it

was the failure to file the depositions, which was fatal to the
motion to supplement.

A filed deposition may be relevant and

material to a motion for summary judgment, and if so should be
considered by the trial court and the appellate court.
Rule 56(e) entitles a party to summary
judgment "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and answers to
admissions on file, together with affidavits,
if any" so warrant.
Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
Rule 56(e) specifically provides that the depositions be filed.
If the depositions are not filed, the trial court
cannot consider them or allegations regarding their content,
because said allegations cannot be verified.

Likewise, if not

filed, the depositions cannot be part of the record on appeal.
In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d
109 (1963), both parties cited to depositions that had remained
sealed.

The depositions had never been seen by the trial

court, and the supreme court therefore did not open the
depositions.

In a footnote, the Utah Supreme Court noted that

the correctness of the depositions used by the parties could
not be known.

Thompson, at 109.

Because the statements relied upon by plaintiff are
cited only to unfiled depositions, plaintiff's statement of
facts should not be considered by this Court.
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IV
GEORGE K. SCHONEY WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED AS A PARTY.
Rule 25(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires dismissal of a deceased party

unless a motion for

substitution is made with 90 days after the death of that party
is suggested.
The suggestion of Mr. Schoneyfs death was made and
filed with the Court.

It was made in Plaintiff's Answers to

Interrogatories/ a copy of which was filed with the trial court
attached to defendants1 Memorandum in Support of their Motion
for Summary Judgment filed December 29, 1987.
1202-1225)

(R. at

The suggestion was properly recorded and served on

plaintiff through her attorney of record.
Ninety days after the suggestion of death was filed
with the trial court, no party had been substituted for the
deceased and no one had sought an extension of time in which to
file a substitution.

Finally, on June 21, 1988f Memorial

.Estates made a motion to dismiss George Schoney as a party to
the action.

At the time of the motion to dismiss, plaintiff

showed no circumstances which could conceivably justify her
failure to substitute another party as plaintiff.

George

Schoney had been deceased for over 27 months, long before the
motion was made, giving plaintiff ample time to make a proper
party substitution.
Plaintiff argues notifying and serving George Schoney's
attorney is not sufficient to make a suggestion of death
-32-

because that attorney is not a representative of the deceased
party's estate, and that therefore, no representative of George
Schoney's estate was properly notified or served.

However,

notification and service on plaintiff was appropriate pursuant
to Rule 25(a), because plaintiff is a successor heir and
beneficiary of George Schoney and is represented by the same
counsel that represented George Schoney up until his death in
this action.
Plaintiff also argues the suggestion of death was
improper because it was not made pursuant to Form 30 of the
forms appended to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The

"Appendix of Forms," Introductory Statement, reads:

"The

following forms are intended for illustration only."

Form 30

is not required to be used in a suggestion of death.

In fact,

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 25(a) only requires that
the suggestion be made "upon the record by service of a
statement of the fact of the death."

Here the suggestion of

death was made upon the record by service of a statement of the
fact of the death from the plaintiff herself in her answer No.
1 found in Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories.

(R. at 1217)

For the foregoing reasons, the suggestion of death was
properly stated, served, and recorded.

Because plaintiff

failed to make a motion within 90 days of the suggestion to
substitute the deceased party, George Schoney was properly
dismissed as a plaintiff.

-33-

V
PLAINTIFF IS LIMITED ON APPEAL TO THOSE ARGUMENTS
CONTAINED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF.
Plaintiff in her docketing statement has stated many
issues.

However, plaintiff has failed to support many of those

issues in her brief, either with any references to the record
on appeal or with authority for the proposition contained in
the docketing statement.

The docketing statement "is not a

brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions."
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Rule 9.

The stating of an

issue without argument does not serve to point out specific
errors or points within the scope of some specific assignment
of error.
Where a point is merely asserted by appellate
counsel without any argument of or authority
for the proposition, it is deemed to be
without foundation and requires no discussion
by the reviewing court.
People v. Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Dist. Cal. 1982).
Issues listed in a docketing statement but not briefed are
deemed abandoned.

State v. Eder, 704 P.2d 465, 469 (N.M. App.

1985).
The docketing statement provides the court with a
concise listing of the arguments expected to be raised by
plaintiff and Memorial Estates.

It is incumbent upon the

plaintiff to state fully with record references and supporting
authority the arguments which allegedly weigh counter to the
trial court's findings.

The reviewing court is not required to
-34-

make an independent search of the record for supporting
authority when the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently state
the basis of its claim.

See Dougherty, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 123.

Where plaintiff has failed in her brief to support
issues raised in the docketing statement/ the plaintiff has not
provided Memorial Estates with a fair opportunity to respond to
the arguments.

That failure, together with the failure to cite

the record and/or authority in support of points of error,
constitutes waiver of any argument regarding any such claimed
error.

See Lecky v. Warren, 635 S.W.2d 752, (Tex. App. 1982).
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff does not raise factual questions which could

in any way lead to the relief she demands.

Nowhere does she

raise any issues as to how or in what amount she has been
damaged.

She has never made demand for performance.

Defendants were and are ready, willing and able to perform all
of their duties under the contract.

Not only did the trial

court not abuse its discretion; but, based upon the facts in
the record, any other action by the trial court would have been
an abuse of its discretion.
For a number of reasons the trial court judgment should
be affirmed:
1)

The trial court ruling ot Memorial Estates Motion
to Strike the Fifth Amended Complaint renders
plaintiff's arguments on appeal on all issues moot.
-35-

2)

Plaintiff failed to submit sufficient facts to the
trial court to support the finding that plaintiff
could have prevailed on any cause of action.

3)

There are insufficient facts in the record on
appeal to support any of the arguments advanced by
plaintiff on this appeal.
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case

is
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so
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The

that

a

traditional brief is not possible.
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recent

serious due process issues.

rulings

of

this

Court
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Schoney is obligated to advise the

Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time.
See Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp. 834 (D.C.D.C. 1986); Cf.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975
(1967) .
Furthermore, error is often cumulative.

See In Re:

Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v.
Hill,
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1047

Industries, 763 S.W.

(Fla.App*

2d 333

1982);

Wiedower

(Mo.App. 1988).
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Therefore this

reply brief will present the due process issue in the context
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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case is seven years old.

After a number of

delays and superficial rulings, Judge Moffat granted summary
judgment for Memorial Estates.
bother to read the file.

The trouble is that he didn't

The summary judgment was granted on

the broadest possible grounds.
Because of the unusual treatment in the trial court,
Schoney was required to brief all possible theories in this
complex case.

Because of a computer failure, Schoney's final

79-page brief was delayed.

This Court struck the 79-page brief

and received, instead,a 30-page preliminary draft brief.
However, the 30-page brief did not include treatment
of the class issues.

Therefore, by striking the 79-page final

brief, this Court effectively dismissed a putative class.

Such

a dismissal violates due process standards established by the
United States Supreme Court, as well as Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(e), which states:

1

A class action may not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the
Court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members
of the class in such manner as the Court
directs.
IV.
ARGUMENT
DUE PROCESS CONCERNS HAVE ARISEN IN THIS CASE
A.

Introduction
This will

procedural

not be a traditional

history

of

this

case

is

reply brief.

so

unusual

The

that

a

traditional brief is not possible.
Specifically,

recent

serious due process issues.

rulings

of

this

Court

raise

Schoney is obligated to advise the

Court of such due process issues at the earliest possible time.
See Sparrow v. Reynolds, 646 F. Supp.

(D.C.D.C. 1986); Cf.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975
(1967).
Furthermore, error is often cumulative.

See In Re t

Santrucek, 145 N.E. 739 (1924) (per Justice Cardozo); Allett v.
Hill,

422

So.2d

1047

Industries, 763 S.W.

(Fla.App.

2d 333

1982);

(Mo.App. 1988).

Wiedower

v.

ACF

Therefore this

reply brief will present the due process issue in the context
of the overall case.
2

B.

Delay
This case was filed on June 14, 1982.

been

set

Schoney

was

responsible for one continuance due to a change in staff.

(R.

510-513.)

The

the

convenience

of

Estates.

and

reset

for

other
the

trial

six

continuances

court

or

the

times!

The case has

were

granted

convenience

of

for

Memorial

Several of the delays were from first place trial

settings.

(See Chronology

at Brief of Appellant, p.

8-9.)

Twice Schoney sought assignment of a special judge to avoid
such delays.

(R. 522, 1085.)

Neither request was granted.

If this case is remanded, it will likely take another
year to get on the trial calendar, and perhaps two years to
process an appeal

from the trial.

When the Schoneys

first

walked into a lawyer's office seven years ago, little did they
realize that it would take a decade to process their modest
claim.
C.

Class Certification and Motions to Enlarge the Class
Early

in

the

litigation,

the

trial

court

(Fishier) certified the case to proceed as a class action.
186, 202-204.)
3

judge
(R.

The

original

rather narrow theories.

class

certification

(See R. 202-204.)

was

based

upon

Therefore, Schoney

made a motion to enlarge the class to include the additional
theories and additional parties.

(R. 278.)

At about the same

time, Memorial Estates made a motion to decertify the class.
(R. 487.)
Judge Dee ruled first on the decertification motion.
(R. 726, p. 1 & 2.)
the class.^

Judge Dee granted that motion to decertify

Next, Judge Dee entertained arguments on the

motion to enlarge the class.2

(R. 726, p. 1-3.)

1

The theory of liability was that Memorial Estates
sold space in non-existent mausoleums, and that Memorial
Estates delayed construction for up to ten years. (See R. 2.)
Judge Dee
limited the potential class to 26 persons.
Apparently only 2 6 persons signed the same form of contract as
Schoneys.
Even though the contract form changed slightly,
Schoney presented nearly 300 contracts from customers who were
victims of the same course of conduct. (R. 727-991.)
As a part of that same scheme, Memorial Estates
issued deeds in non-existent mausoleums. Schoney identified 68
identical deeds for Mountain View and 147 identical deeds for
Redwood. (R. 628-629.)
*
Since the class was then decertified, Schoney
verbally amended the Motion to Enlarge the Class, to be a
Motion to Recertify the Class based upon the new theories of
liability. (See R. 726 at p. 3.)
4

Memorial Estates argued that the Motion to Enlarge
the Class presented no new theories.
MR. SWOPE:
Your Honor, it's in the
Amended Complaint, the Second Amended
Complaint, which has been before this Court
since June 1983, Count V, Breach of
Contract to Provide Chapel.
It's been
before the Court.
Count VI, Breach of
Trust. It's been before the Court. Count
VII, Breach of Statutory Trust. It's been
before the Court. Count VIII, Invasion of
Trust Corpus.
Count X, Failure to
Establish a Statutory Trust.
All these
have been before the Court. These are not
new issues. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 726, p. 8.)
The Court agreed with Memorial Estates.
the Motion to Enlarge the Class.
did not go to the merits.

The Court denied

However, the Court's ruling

The Court simply concluded that the

Motion to Enlarge the Class had already been considered:
And the date of my decision (to decertify
the class) being last Tuesday covers all of
the things that have been done so far. . .
So I've considered all of these new
theories, and I am denying your Motion to
Enlarge the Class for the three theories,
which are not new theories.
They have
already been considered.
They are in
writing in the file. And I'm decertifying
the class. (Emphasis added.)
(R. 726, p. 11-12. )
In

short,

stepped the issue.

Judge

Dee

(second

judge)

simply

side-

It is abundantly clear that the Motion to
5

Decertify the Class presents wholly different issues from the
Motion to Enlarge the Class.
and

R.

487-492.)

followed

the

Rather

misleading

(Compare R. 202-204; R. 280-285;
Judge

Dee

statement

(second
of

judge)

Memorial

simply

Estates'

counsel.-*
D.

Repeated Application For Summary Judgment
After

date

waiting

literally

six years

to get a trial

(See para. B above) and after the class was dismissed

under unusual circumstances (See C above), the eve of the
trial

finally approached.

By now a third judge was on the

scene (Moffat).
Memorial Estates filed a motion for summary judgment.
(R. 1363.)

The Motion for Summary Judgment was granted.

(R. 1377.)

This appeal followed.

The problem is that this was Memorial Estates' third
try at summary
filed —

judgment.

Twice before Memorial Estates had

and lost summary judgment motions.

R. 1301.)

(R. 700 and

The third Motion for Summary Judgment was in all

material respects exactly the same as the first two motions for
summary judgment.

(Compare R. 472; R. 1200; and R. 136 3.)

J

[Mr. Swope for Memorial Estates]
"All these have been before the Court.
theories." (R. 726, p. 8.)
6

These are not new

In short, Memorial Estates' judge shopping
paid off and they
theories.

finally

found a judge who would agree with their

The problem is that such judge shopping is a square

violation of §78-7-19, Utah Code Ann.
If an application for an order. . . is
refused in whole or in part. . . no
subsequent application for the same order
can be made to any other judge, except of a
higher court.
E.

Failure to Review the Record
Undaunted by the fact that the same motion had been

heard on two prior occasions, (See Para. D above) Judge Moffat
forged ahead.

The problem is that Judge Moffat didn't bother

with the nicety of reading the file.

After two other judges

had managed this complex case for over six years, Judge Moffat
casually mentioned:
We have a Motion for Summary
Judgment. Haven't had a chance to look at
the file. . .
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.)
Thus Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to,
"... carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..."
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d

1266

(Utah

1976).

Under lesser

circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments.
Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc., 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.

7

1980); Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp,, 722
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983) .
During the course of the summary judgment hearing,
numerous fact issues were examined:
interrogatories were

viz. whether defendant's

lost or delayed

in the mail

(June 21,

1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines 18-25); whether Memorial Estates had ever
made a suggestion of death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11,
Lines 17-20; p. 12, Lines 10-13); whether an offer of judgment
in the sum of $4,000 would satisfy all of Schoney's claims
(June

21 Tr. at p.

shown a picture of

14, Lines

7-11);

the mausoleum

whether

Schoneys

were

before it was constructed

(June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether the Schoneys were
shown a rendering of a mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain
View

(June

21

Tr.

at

p.

16,

Lines

20-25);

whether

the

mausoleums at Mountain View and Redwood Road were substantially
the same

(June 21 Tr. at p. 17, Lines

11-15); whether the

construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road put the Schoneys on
notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain View would be of the
same quality

(June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines 6-10); whether a

chapel has always been available at Mountain View (June 21 Tr.
at p. 18, Line 22 - p. 19, Line 5 ) ; whether it was reasonable
for

Schoneys

to

purchase

an

alternate

mausoleum

space

(at

Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial Estates
8

sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr. at p.
31, Lines 1-4); whether the Schoneys purchased a mausoleum at
Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr. at p. 36 and 37);
whether Memorial

Estates properly

accounted

for trust funds

(June 21 Tr. at p. 43, Lines 8-22); whether Memorial Estates
held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr. at p. 4 6, Lines
1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys that their money
would be held in trust (June 21 Tr. at p. 46, Lines 10-19);
whether Memorial Estates represented that a mausoleum would be
built when there were no plans to do so (June 21 Tr. at p. 47,
Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable for Memorial Estates to
substitute an LDS chapel for the Schoneys, who were a non-LDS
family (June 21 Tr. at p. 48, Lines 12-22); whether a chapel
was available at both Mountain View and Redwood Road (June 21
Tr.

at

p.

prejudiced^

51,

Lines

because

1-3); whether
Schoney

approximately 15 days late.^

Memorial

answered

Estates

was

interrogatories

(June 21 Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-

15.)
4
Memorial Estates was guilty of numerous discovery
delays much more serious than 15 days. (See Brief of Appellant
at p. 7.)
5
Memorial Estates argued that the case of W. W. & W. B.
Gardner v. Parkwest Valley, 568 P.2d 734 justified dismissal as
a sanction.
(June 21 Tr. at p. 4-5.)
Without reading the
case, Judge Moffat held that the Gardner case "requires"
dismissal. (June 21 Tr. at 51.)
9

In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to
grant summary judgment in such a complicated case, and in face
of numerous fact issues, without even reading the file.
F.

Refusal to Permit Schoneys to File a Complete Brief
After losing in the trial court, Schoneys appealed.

The

legal

theories

were

numerous

and

complex.

At

the

conclusion of oral argument, Judge Moffat stated:
I think Mr. Peck's motions are well taken
in every instance. . .
(June 21 Tr. at p. 51.)
That

simple

statement

covers

a

lot of

territory.

Such a

shotgun ruling, ". . . made without a deliberate articulation
of

its

rationale,

including

some

appraisal
[does

of

not]

the
allow

factors

underlying

the

court's

decision

disciplined

and

informed

review of the Court's discretion."

Sarqeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978).
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.°

for

a

Compare

In short, Schoney

was left to brief all possible issues in a very complex case.

b

"The Court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules . . . 56. . . when the motion is based on more than
one ground."
10

Schoney filed a 30 page preliminary draft brief, and
moved for an additional
brief.

five working days to file the final

The grounds for the motion were that the word

processing equipment had broken down.

(Motion and Order to

File Brief with Leave to File Substitute Brief, dated February
10, 1989.)

That motion was denied.

(Order, dated March 7,

1989. ) See Exhibit A,
With one exception, Schoney does not wish to reargue
the substance of that order —

nor would it be proper to do so.

However, one aspect of that order raises due process concerns.
Schoneys
In

connection

with

filed a 30 page preliminary
that

filing, Schoney

draft brief.

specifically

noted

that:
Appellant's counsel has prepared a brief
and motion to file with leave to substitute
Exhibits A and B hereto are drafts of both.
The draft of the brief is not the current
one; the current one is in the word
processor memory.
At about 9:00 a.m.
today, February
10, 1989, the office
printer broke down. . .(Emphasis added.)
(Motion to File Brief with Leave
dated

February

10, 1989.)

to File Substitute Brief,

The motion was

manager of the word processing department.

11

attested

by the

This Court's order of March 7, 1989 did not permit
Schoney to file the version of the brief that was finished—
albeit locked in a broken down computer.

Rather, this Court's

order stated:
It is further ORDERED that the draft brief
filed on 10 February, 1989 shall comprise
Appellant's Brief.
Appellant shall have
the draft bound and shall file the bound
brief before 10 March, 1989.
(Order, 7 March, 1989.)
In summary, Schoney was

faced with

an awesome task to

summarize six years of litigation in a final appellate brief.
The task was especially difficult because of the superficial
treatment of issues, and shotgun rulings below.
D, E, above.)

(See Para. C,

Schoney had in fact written a complete brief.

However, because of an equipment

failure, Schoneys were not

permitted to file that complete brief.
G.

Dissolution of Class
The

30

page

brief

filed

include a treatment of class issues.

1

on

February

10 did

not

The final 79 page brief,

Schoney believes that the Brief which was locked in
the computer on February 10, 1989 was, in fact, the 79 page
Brief dated 21 February, 1989 (which was rejected by this
Court.)
However, the attorney in charge of the file has been
fired for his mishandling this appeal.
Thus, it may not be
possible to reconstruct exactly what was in the computer on
February 10, 1989.
12

which was rejected by this Court, did include a treatment of
the class issues.
Without regard to fault or error,** the result is that
the putative class has disappeared.

However, that violates

due process rights of the putative class members.
An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is
to be
accorded
finality
is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise
interested
parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306; 70
S.Ct. 652 (1950).
Although Mullane was not a class action, it provides
the due process touchstone for all class actions, see Phillips
Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 012 (1985).
implement

those due process

considerations, Rule

In order to
23(e) Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure states:

8
This Court apparently views the issue as being
Schoney's fault for trying to make substantive changes after a
brief was filed pursuant to the Court's "Lodging Policy". See
Order, 7 March, 1989.
On the other hand, Schoney views the
issue as clear error. Schoney contends that the February 10,
1989 filing had nothing to do with the "Lodging Policy". (That
policy has never been promulgated.)
Rather, it was a garden
variety showing of "good cause" for an enlargement of time
pursuant to Rule 22(b), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
(See Schoneys' Motion for Review, dated 9 March, 1989.)
13

A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the
Court, and notice of the dismissal or
compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court
directs. (Emphasis added.)
Due process considerations

require that Rule 23(e)

should apply even where the class has not been certified if
there is any prejudice to absent class members.

Simer v. Rios,

661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981).
In this case, absent class members

are prejudiced

because they might choose to file individual claims if they
were aware that the class - was dissolved.

Furthermore, this

Court has failed to even consider Rule 23(e) in connection with
the dismissal (or dissolution) of the class.^
V.
CONCLUSION
This case has been fraught with delay and superficial
treatment by the trial court.

The cumulative error required

Schoney to write a far reaching brief on every possible aspect

9
It is no solution for the Court to simply blame
Schoney's counsel.
Due process requires that the named
plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of
the class. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985).
14

of the case.

Schoney accomplished that formidable task in a

reasonable time.

Because of equipment failure the final draft

of the brief was delayed.

This Court struck Schoney's final

brief, and with that ruling the class also fell.
The

totality

of

these

circumstances

has

deprived

putative class members as well as Schoney of their due process
rights.
The only solution is to remand to the trial court for
total reprocessing of the class issues and the summary judgment
issues.

DATED this o < C /

day of

\JCC (//•

, 1989

ROBERT J. DEKRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

BY:
ROBERT J. DEBRY
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this
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JOSEPH L. HENRIOD
ROMNEY, CONDIE, HENRIOD & HENRIOD
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
DAVID SWOPE
NIELSEN & SENIOR
36 South State, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

_0.
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EXHIBIT A

Page 2

The lodging policy in effect in February 1989, provided
appellant five additional working days to correct technical
defects and to file a substitute brief*

Appellant failed to file

a substitute brief within the five day period*

By correspondence

dated 16 February 1989, the Court notified appellant that the
brief was in default and that the appeal could be dismissed
unless a substitute brief was filed by 24 February 1989*

Appellants substitute brief was filed on 21 February
1989*

The briof, exclusive of the table of contents, table of

authorities and appendix, is 79 pages in length. Appellant's
corrections go to the substance of the brief as well as to
defects which may be addressed under the lodging policy. Thus,
the substitute brief is improper*

Now, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that appellant's
Motion To File Overlength Brief is denied.

It is further ORDERED

that the draft brief filed on 10 February 1989 shall comprise
appellant's brief. Appellant shall have the draft bound and
shall file the bound brief, together with seven copies, on or
before 10 March 1983•

Although th^ overlengfch brief is not

accepted, the Appendix To Appellant's Brief, filed 21 February
1989, is accepted.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL
-

OOOOO——

George K,. Schoney and
Erma J. Schoney, et al./
Plaintiffs and Appellants/

ORDER
Case No* 880630-CA

Memorial Estates, Inc./
Defendants and Respondents•

This matter is before the Court upon <a) appellant's
several motions for extensions to file appellant's brief, (b)
appellant's Motion To File Overlength Brief/ filed 21 February
1989, (c) respondent's Motion To Dismiss/ filed 21 February 1989
and (d) appellant's Motion To Refer Motion To Dismiss, filed 1
March 1989.

On 10 February 1989/ appellant filed a 30 page brief, in
draft form, together with a Motion To File Brief With Leave To
File Substitute Brief.

Thereafter, on 21 February 1989,

appellant filed a Motion To Extend Tine For Filing Substitute
Brief and a Motion To File Overlength Brief.

The substitute bri^f was filed pursuant to the Court's
internal policy for lodging briefs*

The purpose of the policy is

to permit a party, who makes a good faith effort to timely file a
brief, extra time to correct technical defects in the brief•
Technical defects include improper covers, inadequate binding or
lack of binding, incorrect pagination, and etc.

The lodging

policy does not provide an opportunity to amend the substance of
the arguments contained in the brief.

Page 3

It is also ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss is
denied•

Respondent's brief shall be due thirty days from 10

March 1989. That is, respondent shall file its brief on or before
9 April 1989.

Further/ it is ORDERED that appellant's Motion To

Refer Motion To Dismiss is denied.

Dated this

~7?£

day of March 1989.

BY THE COURT:

4L&
Judge Russell W. Bench

1

I have the answer.

2

Complaint.

I am looking for the Fifth Amended

I have got it.

Thank you.

3

You may proceed.

It was out of order.

4 I

MR. HENRIOD:

5

The first motion we would like to make is the

Thank you, your Honor.

6

motion to strike.

A little background is helpful.

The

7

defendant made a motion for summary judgment on January 15th;

8

and at that time, the plaintiffs1 response was to request

9

the Court to allow them to address those issues with

10 another amended complaint, the fifth one.
11

On the part of the defendant, we reasonably

12

anticipated they were going to cut down on the complaint,

13

based on the argument that we made in our motion for

14

summary judgment.

15

left everything in, and included additional items to which

16

we needed to do some discovery.

17

As a matter of fact, they didn't.

The Court set a discovery schedule.

They

The last

18

date for responding to discovery was June 10th.

19

2 9th, the defendant sent interrogatories to the plaintiff.

20

There were no answers within 30 days.

21

answered by the 10th.

22

I don't know why they weren't answered on time.

23

scheduling problems.

24
25

On April

They were not

There was communication with counsel.
Some

We received a copy of the answer this morning as
we came into the courtroom.

It's the defendants' position

1

that the complaint should be stricken and the default

2

judgment should be entered against the plaintiff because of

3

their failure to answer those interrogatories in a timely

4

fashion.

5

We would cite to the Court the case of W.W.&.W.B.

6

Gardner, Inc. vs. Parkwest Valley, Inc., found at 568 P.2d,

7

Page 734, a 1977 Utah case.

8

last page, Page 738, states halfway down the first column,

9

"Under Rule 37(d), sanctions are justified without

The court in that case on the

10 reference as to whether the inexcused failure to make
11

discovery was willful.

12

justified where there has been a frustration of the judicial

13

process where the failure to respond to discovery in each

14

trial on the merits make it impossible to ascertain whether

15

the allegations of the answer have any factual merit."

16

The sanction of default judgment is

It's important to note that the original complaint

17 was filed back in 1982; and our summary judgment motion went
18

to issues that the plaintiff readily responded to as being

19

out of date; namely, whether the mausoleum was built or not.

20

These interrogatories that were sent and received the 15th,

21

the amended complaint went right to the heart of this case.

22

The contentions in the interrogatories, is whether they

23

still claim a certain cause of action exists and what the

24

factual basis for that is, we do not have in time to prepare

25

this motion today.

We only have just seen them.

1

Now, this same case, the Gardner case, on Page 737

2

in that case, the party that had answered late had received

3

answers to interrogatories between the time they were due;

4

between the motion for sanctions and the time for hearing.

5

And the Court said that is not good enough.

6

failure to answer, and failure all by itself, provides the

7

impetus for the invoking of sanctions.

8

been filed, you can't put a last-minute answer in and

9

remedy your problem.

10

That is a

Once the motion has

We've got a trial date set in this case for

H

July 6th.

If the Court were to combine these motions with

12

the motion for summary judgment that Mr. Peck is going to

13

argue the merits in this case is so negligible, combined

14

with this failure to answer on time that we think the

15

appropriate entry be a default judgment.

16

Thank you, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. BERTCH:

Thank you.
The mailing certificate on the

19

interrogatories does reveal it was mailed allegedly April

20

2 9th, 1988.

Now, my secretary tells me that we didn't

21

receive it.

And I have no reason to doubt her word.

22

on vacation from June the 3rd to June 12th.

23

gone, Mr. Henriod gave my office the courtesy of a phone

24

call to see if there was a mix-up or a problem.

25

fact, my secretary indicated that she hadn't got the

I was

While I was

And in

1 interrogatories.
2

And so he sent over another copy.

When I got back from vacation, I prepared the

3

answer.

4

last part of last week, and

5

last night.

6

once we actually got the discovery in our office.

7

The only living plaintiff left was on vacation the
was unable to sign them until

So, I did exercise as much diligence as I could

If I could just step back and put this in the big

8

picture.

The real problem is, they waited until the last

9

minute to send the interrogatories.

And then, when we were

10 possibly a few days late on it, there was no extra time left,
11 And in the context of a seven-year-old case, it doesn't seem
12

fair to me to do that.

To send interrogatories and require

13

answers eight days before the discovery deadline and then

14

complain if they're not answered strictly within 30 days.

15

I would suggest to the Court, that we not delay

16

the trial date.

17

grant their motions for summary judgment.

18

the interrogatories is, for the most part, cumulative of

19

things that we have already discovered.

20

had an opportunity to take depositions of both plaintiffs

21

while they were still living, then Erma is still with us.

22

Did not inquire into these matters at that time.

23

That's assuming that the Court does not
The matter in

The defendant has

The only new matter in the fifth amended complaint

24

has to do with the allegations that the mausoleum as built

25

didn't look like the ones that were shown to the plaintiffs.
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